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ABSTRACT

(

In 1990 the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA
'90) became law (P.L. 101-508).

Language in this statute

requires that drug manufacturers provide rebates to each
state Medicaid program (See Appendix 3) for prescription
drugs purchased through the program.

Rebates are calculated

by a formula, but in general are written to reduce drug
acquisition costs of 15% below wholesale acquisition cost,
that is, 15% below the prices paid by wholesalers to the
manufacturers for drugs distributed to the retail class of
trade.

These discounts only apply to the prescription drug

coverage portion of the Medicaid

1

program.

Though intended

to secure low prices for prescription drugs purchased
through the federal Medicaid program, it was hypothesized as
a basis for this project that OBRA '90 mandated discounts
would result in a cost shifting and increased prices paid by
other market segments, and, that by reducing manufacturer
profits, would reduce funding for manufacturer sponsored
pharmaceutical research.
To explore these hypotheses a population was defined
and a structured, closed end, opinion questionnaire was
devised.

A list of qualified bidders for the State of Rhode

Island annual drug bids was selected.

This list comprised

an entire universe of manufacturers who are involved in
competitive bidding on the state contracts.

The list of 89

vendors, though small in absolute terms, does cover the

ii
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available pharmaceutical market as defined by the needs of
those patients served by various facilities associated with
the State of Rhode Island.
Respondents at central bid addresses were asked to
complete anonymous questionnaires.

Questionnaire design

concentrated on brevity, ease of answer, and on not inducing
bias.

The only incentive offered to completing the

questionnaire was a copy of the results.
It was found that opinions expressed in the
questionnaire supported the hypothesis that OBRA '90 would
add upward pressure to drug prices in general.

Responses

suggest that OBRA '90 will have the effect of decreasing
manufacturer profit, increasing costs to buyers other than
Medicaid, and decreasing respondents ability to offer low
prices in competitive bids for both innovator and generic
drugs.

Within study limitations, modest support was found

for the hypothesis that lower manufacturer profits meant
less funding for research.

iii
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PREFACE
In the Spring of 1990, Senator David Pryor sponsored
the "Pharmaceutical Access and Prudent Purchasing Act" and
the Medicaid Anti-discriminatory Drug Act."

In the House of

Representatives, Ron Wyden and Jim Cooper sponsored the
"Medicaid Prescription Drug Fair Access and Pricing Act".
These measures contain some provisions designed to secure
for Medicaid some of the discounts on prescription drugs
available to other buyers.

Significant portions of these

three bills were incorporated into the "Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990" (OBRA '90).

On November 5,

1990, OBRA '90 was signed into law. 2
Anecdotally, there exists a wide disparity in
pharmaceutical pricing offered to the various groups of
purchasers considered in this questionnaire.

Historically,

the Veterans Administration depot pricing has been reputed
to be the recipient of the lowest prices and the price paid
by the independent pharmacy the highest, while all the other
groups have fallen somewhere in between.

While the

pharmaceutical buyer for the State of Rhode Island, an
attempt was made to obtain a list of prices offered to the
Veterans Administration to use as a benchmark in gauging the
success of Rhode Island's procurement efforts.

No one

reached at the Veterans Administration would agree to
provide these data.
While not supported by specific data, it is a long-
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standing complaint among pharmacists that large price
disparities in drug purchasing exist.

As an extreme

example, at one time the General Hospital, State of Rhode
Island, was paying one cent each for nitroglycerine patches
while the Average Wholesale Price 3 to pharmacies in the same
community was one dollar each.

4

In 1990, primarily due to

Senator David Pryor, the U.S. Senate became aware that while
one U.S. Government agency, the Veterans Administration, was
buying pharmaceuticals at bargain prices, another branch of
Government, the Health Care Financing Administration for
Medicaid, was paying approximately the same price as retail
pharmacies, i.e., the highest. 5

The Senate, in an effort to

reduce the dollar outlay for Medicaid patients, included
certain provisions in OBRA '90 aimed at reducing the prices
of drugs to Medicaid.
Language provisions pertinent to this thesis mandate an
increasing schedule of rebates (Appendix 3) that will be
returned to the Medicaid Program by the manufacturers.

The

Act benefits only the Medicaid .Program expenditures and does
not address other markets.
The goal of this research is to explore the effect of
OBRA '90 mandated rebates on purchasers other than Medicaid
by sending a brief questionnaire to companies active in the
annual State of Rhode Island pharmaceutical bid.

The

questionnaire was sent to the central bid addresses of all
vendors on the State of Rhode Island pharmaceutical bid

vii
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list.
The questionnaire was composed of 12 questions and four
additional classification questions.

The classification

questions were designed to identify the type of business of
the respondents.

Classification separated "brand name,

innovator" manufacturers from generic manufacturers and
"other" businesses.

Classification was necessary because

OBRA '90 mandates different rebate treatments between
generic and innovator manufacturers.

Because

nonmanufacturers were not specifically addressed by OBRA
'90, they will be impacted differently, possibly only
peripherally.

Classification, then, allowed assessment of

respondents market position when considering their answers.
Responses were analyzed to study bidders opinions on
the impact of OBRA '90 on their activities.

Questions were

designed to explore certain possible areas of OBRA '90
impact thought to be relevant to their daily business
routine, that is, the sale of pharmaceuticals, and,
particularly, sales by competitive bidding.
the information sought was:

Essentially,

What will be the effect on drug

prices in market segments other than Medicaid?

Will

mandated discounts be a disincentive to manufacturers to
provide special pricing to buying groups and institutions?
If profit margins are reduced, will funding for new drug
research decline?
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ISSUES AND HYPOTHESES

(
ISSUES:

The passage of the OBRA '90 budget legislation included
provisions designed to reduce the cost of prescription
medication to Medicaid (see also, Introduction).

The Act

mandates that rebates (Appendix 3) shall be made to Medicaid
ultimately amounting to as much as 15% of the "Average
Manufacturers Price" (AMP).

AMP is "the average price paid

by wholesalers for drugs distributed to the retail class of
trade."

Should a manufacturer offer "any buyer" a lower

price than can be had with the rebate schedule, the Act
requires that Medicaid receive additional rebates to equal
that lower price.

This is referred to as the "best price"

and is defined by OBRA '90 as ".

the lowest price paid

by any purchaser (exclusive of depot prices and single award
contract prices as defined by an federal agency)
· exclusive of nominal prices."
In the literature reviewed, the OBRA '90 mandated
Medicaid rebates appear to be unprecedented.

In effect, the

federal government has dictated pricing methods to private
manufacturers where previously pricing had been dictated by
market considerations.

While evidence is available that

various groups have been able to negotiate prices in the
past, this has been through bargaining power:
"The characteristic of competitive market conditions
was found to significantly influence lowering of prices
offered to purchasing groups."6

1

(

Also it is known that prices do vary:
"
. a major limitation of earlier drug pricing
studies was that the data were obtained from published
price lists, which do not reflect the actual prices
paid. This finding is similar to the conclusion
reached by Stigler and Kindhl on the basis of their
study of several industrial markets.
They found that
published price lists tend to be rigid and do not
accurately reflect the behavior of actual transaction
prices. For nationally sold products, actual
transaction prices tend to be lower and display a mu7h
more flexible behavior pattern than catalog prices."
The OBRA '90 rebates caused much speculation that a
cost shifting would be felt by non-Medicaid purchasers, as
manufacturers conceivably sought to recapture lost profit
margin:
"Pharmaceutical manufacturers are said to be raising
prices to other purchasers, including other government
agencies, So recover the discounts being offered to
Medicaid."
Indeed, almost as soon as OBRA '90 was passed, concerns
about price increases to non-Medicaid purchasers began to
appear in the media.

The September, 1990, issue of The

Consultant Pharmacist warned.
"
. economic realities suggest there is a strong
likelihood that major manufacturers will shift costs to
private payers as a 9esult of the proposal's
implementation. . . "
And, as early as January 14, 1991, Senator David Pryor is
reported as writing that there are:
"
numerous confirmed reports that some drug
manufacturers are in the process of reducing discounts
. . . breaking long-term contracts, ~fid refusing to
negotiate in good faith over price."
While there was much conjecture about OBRA '90's effect
on pricing, the literature search uncovered no systematic
research on the topic except for an informal anecdotal
2

survey conducted by the American Society of Hospital
Pharmacists that,
"
according to ASHP (American Society of Hospital
Pharmacists)
(their survey)
. confirms what
it predicted last year, that the law would have the
unintended effect of raising drug cosrf to hospitals,
HMO's, and community health centers."
While the most numerous objections found were from the
ranks of various pharmaceutical market segments, the
objections of pharmaceutical manufacturers were also in
evidence.

These generally predicted loss of research monies

available to develop new pharmaceuticals.

Such as:

"
. insurers attempts to contain health care costs
by controlling pharmaceutical expenditures may decrease
incentives to pursue innovation in drug development,
and discoura~Z investment in pharmaceutical
R

&

D •••

II

And this, from the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association:
"The research-based pharmaceutical industry invests 17
percent of sales in R & D .
. this commitment to
research will result in future breakthrough drugs .
the proposals advanced by Senator David Pryor woy~d
clearly dampen the incentives to innovate .
"
Problem:
That the federal government should mandate prices and
rebates from private manufacturers is a significant
departure from the usual sense of a free market economy,
where prices are based on competition.

As such, one wonders

about the impact of OBRA '90 on a highly competitive
procedure such as the bid process.

Sentiments reported in

the media (above) predicted that forced rebates to one
particular market segment, Medicaid, would affect the prices

3

available to other purchasers.

The issues are:

The existence of the "best price" language may limit
manufacturers' ability to offer any buyer a lower price
than Medicaid.
Buyers, such as institutions and other competitive
bidders, who previously obtained deep discount may be
unable to maintain them as manufacturers seek to avoid
the additional "best price" rebates such discounts
would trigger.
On the manufacturing side, rebates may reduce profits
which some have said may lead to a reduction in
research funding for new drug products.
HYPOTHESES:
This work seeks to explore the impact of OBRA '90
rebates on pharmaceutical pricing and particularly its
effect on competitive bidding for pharmaceuticals in Rhode
Island.

An anonymous mail questionnaire (see Methodology,

Exhibits) was developed to solicit opinion from business
insiders (see Methodology) regarding OBRA '90's effects.
Responses were analyzed to sustain or refute the following
hypotheses.
Hypotheses:
Hl. That most manufacturers on the State of Rhode
Island bid list are familiar with the OBRA '90 mandated
Medicaid rebate requirements.
H2. That most manufacturers are participating in the
OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates.
H3. That most manufacturers will continue to
participate or will begin to participate in the OBRA
'90 mandated Medicaid rebates in the near term (one
year).
H4. That a majority of manufacturers will expect to
lose some Gross Profit margin as a result of furnishing
Medicaid rebates to each state Medicaid plan.
4

(

HS. That a reduction in profits because of the OBRA
'90 mandated Medicaid rebates will be · perceived as
causing a reduction in funds available to support
research.
H6.
That the following effects will occur in drug bid
acquisitions:
H6a: That OBRA '90 mandated rebates to one
segment of the pharmaceutical market will have the
unwanted effect of exerting an upward influence on
prices available to buyers other than Medicaid.
H6b: That all purchasers do not necessarily pay
the same price for pharmaceuticals.
H6c: That OBRA '90 will not cause all purchasers
to receive the same price.
H6d: That while a "best price" will be known and
established in order to calculate the Medicaid
rebate amounts, it will not be made generally
available to buyers to serve as a reference tool
or benchmark against which they might judge the
success of their acquisitions.
H6e: That OBRA '90 will diminish manufacturers
ability to offer low bid prices on innovator drugs
to competitive bid acquisitions.
H6f: That OBRA '90 will diminish manufacturers
ability to offer low bid prices on generic drugs
to competitive bid acquisitions.
H6g: That if a competitive procurement group's
acquisition can become classified as an "exempt
award" and, therefore, not a factor to be
considered in the Medicaid "best price" rebate
calculations, this will result in lower prices
being offered.

5

METHODOLOGY

(

Development of the Questionnaire:
A copy of the legislation was obtained and reviewed.
Based on this and preliminary literature research,
questions were developed, refined and formatted into a
survey.

Survey Design:
A structured, undisguised survey design was chosen for
ease of tabulation.
point scale.

Survey scale was selected as a five

This allowed respondents to select a "degree"

of response instead of simply an affirmative, negative or
"don't know."

As percentages were to be calculated on the

basis of total surveys returned this effectively
proportioned "no answer" responses among the fixed
alternatives.

Therefore, "no answer" responses would be

· tabulated and reported separately so that they could be
"distributed by the reader," if desired, which more
completely disclosed the results.

Structured items on the

questionnaire were precoded for ease of tabulation.

The

necessity of quoting the actual wording used in the OBRA '90
regulations for the sake of clarity caused some questions to
be lengthy.

Since three pages was the practical limit to

the questionnaire because of postage considerations and the
desire to improve response by making the survey as brief as

6
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possible, the number of questions included was sixteen.
These were composed of twelve research questions and four
classification questions, an optional job description
question and a suitable space for respondent's address,
should he/she request a copy of the results.
Of the research questions, questions one through three
were designed to ease respondents into the subject matter.
These questions are easy to answer and nonthreatening;
sensitive issues are best reserved for later in the work.
These questions also e

14

a blish that the respondent is

knowledgeable in the area being studied and that OBRA '90
mandated rebates will have some effect on his/her company in
the near term.

Questions four and five explore the

financial impact of OBRA '90 on respondents' firm.

Question

number seven attempts to establish that different purchasers
receive different prices for pharmaceuticals while question
number eight asks if the OBRA '90 regulations will encourage
·their company to charge all purchasers the same price.
Question number nine asks if respondents will publish the
"best price" as defined by OBRA '90 in a generally available
location.

Questions ten, eleven and twelve explore

respondents' opinion of the impact of OBRA '90 on special
pricing their companies make available to competitive
procurement groups.
The classification questions, thirteen through sixteen,
were included to determine the type of business of
respondent.

This was needed because OBRA '90 mandated
7

rebates were written to affect manufacturers and among
manufacturers the law treats innovator and generic
manufacturers differently.

Thus, the type of respondent's

business was useful in evaluating their response.
One unnumbered open-ended question was included on a
strictly optional basis asking respondents for their job
title.

Answers were wanted to establish that no particular

position was overly represented, for instance, that
responses were not limited to presidents of corporations
(see results).

Because it was felt more important to

maximize response to the questionnaire by preserving
anonymity, the question was made optional.
It was hoped that copies of results offered to an
audience that had a significant interest in this topic might
act as incentive to increase participation and accuracy of
results.

In theory, those that wished to view the results

would exercise more care in filling out the questionnaire as
well as respond in a more timely fashion.

Special effort

was taken to promise confidentiality to participants so that
responses would be unguarded and anonymity protecting
against possible job conflict.

Further, confidentiality was

ensured by using an "unkeyed" questionnaire and the promise
of no hidden identifiers to the recipients.

This

necessitated assigning key numbers to all returns before
tabulation.
Several staff members of the Department of Pharmacy
Practice were chosen as a pretest audience for the
8

r

questionnaire.

While this might seem a biased testing

group, this selection was needed because the subject matter
of the questionnaire requires some understanding of the
pharmaceutical industry, pharmaceutical procurement and
topics relevant to it.
Population Sampled:
A duplicate of the current bid list for the State of
Rhode Island annual sealed drug bids was obtained.
list was selected because

~t

This

is composed of vendors known to

be active in bid acquisitions in Rhode Island.

It has been

updated to reflect recent takeovers and mergers within the
drug industry.

This list is excellent for this research

application because it will direct surveys to those central
addresses where bid/contract decisions are actually made.

At

these locations the cover letter was addressed to the
Director of Professional Relations.

In the event that the

addressee felt unable or unqualified to answer, it was
requested that the survey be forwarded to an individual with
the appropriate authority and expertise who would answer.
Individuals at these addresses are able to extend
special competitive pricing to, and enter into binding
contracts with, pharmaceutical buyers.

It can be reasoned

that individuals empowered to set prices for a given
corporation occupy responsible positions within that
corporation and may be considered "key man" individuals.

As

such, they would have at least the required inside knowledge

9

to field any technical questions of the general nature posed
by this questionnaire regarding profits and policies.

In

addition, the questionnaire was carefully designed not to
require highly specific sensitive data about pricing and
profits that might be restricted to those at the highest
corporate levels only.
While it may be argued that bias is introduced by this
list, it is instead the most appropriate list to the
research as it consists of manufacturers who actively bid on
drug contracts and the focus of this research is the impact
of the OBRA '90 legislation on this type of procurement.
Furthermore, the list contains only 89 vendors, and is,
therefore, of convenient size while comprising the entire
universe of bidders on these Rhode Island pharmaceutical
contracts.

Selection of this list also eliminates the need

to select a suitable sample size as the entire universe can
be polled.
Non-Response Bias:
A Response Rate of 28/89, or 31% was achieved.
statistical adjustment was made for nonresponse.

No

As with

all surveys the possibility of bias caused by nonresponse,
failure to obtain information from some elements of the
population that were selected and designated for the sample,
must be acknowledged.

Regrettably, available resources

allowed only one wave of questionnaire distribution and a
single follow-up and no monetary incentive.

10

Also, callbacks

were not possible because of the anonymous nature of the
questionnaire.

No attempt was made to adjust for

nonresponse bias in the small population sampled; rather,
efforts centered on minimizing possible bias by maximizing
response.
It was possible to employ two strategies
nonresponse:

15

to reduce

general methods designed to increase initial

response rate and a follow-up letter to obtain additional
respo n se.

Steps to maximize initial response used were:

- an " appeal" for response in a carefully composed
cover letter;
- the promise of anonymity;
- questions designed not to probe sensitive areas
because, "non response tends to increase with i:ge
sensitivity of the information being sought.";
- questions designed not to require such technical or
specialized knowledge as only a few respondents might
possess;
the promise and appearance of brevity in
questionnaire design;
- the offer of a copy of the results to respondents;
- "don't know" and no answers reported separately
because they "
can be treated as separate
categories when reporting the results 17 . . in many
ways this is the best strategy . . . "
While every effort was made to maximize response by
incorporating basic tenets of questionnaire and cover letter
design, some nonresponse bias must be assumed in any survey.
Nonresponse bias may be mitigated somewhat in this work
because an entire universe was sampled and the population
selected was not a random population.

11

The more

homogeneous the sample (i.e., the fewer conceivable
subgroups it contains) the less the need for a high
percentage of response.

18

The sampling frame composed the

entire list of bidders on the State of Rhode Island
Pharmaceutical Bids.

Bidders on this list must submit an

acceptable qualification questionnaire to the Division of
Purchasing before inclusion.

Thus, it can be argued, that

nonresponders are less likely to differ from responders than
if the questionnaire was sent to a more random population.
Timeframe:
A first mailing was sent out on June 1, 1992.
follow - up letter was sent out on June 4, 1992.

A

Keyed

questionnaires contain hidden codes of various types that
allow researchers to know which addressee has responded.
Because this survey was unkeyed to guarantee anonymity, the
follow-up letter was sent to the entire universe and took the
caution of expressing appreciation in case the recipient had
already answered.

As it is customary to receive 90% of all

responses within three weeks,

19

this survey was closed on

June 30, 1992.
Selection of Respondent Groups:
Classification questions at the end of the survey allow
the responses to be grouped among nonmanufacturers,
manufacturers of innovator prescription drugs and
manufacturers of generic drugs.

12

An open ended job

classification section was included to ensure that
responders represented a broad group of individuals and that
no one group was overly represented.

For reasons of

confidentiality, this section was indicated as "strictly
optional."

It was considered more important to do

everything possible to maximize response by not compromising
anonymity than to have 100% response to this question.
Sixteen of twenty-eight respondents chose to answer the
optional classification question.

Responses were broken

down as follows:
Sales or Marketing Manager ............. : ..... 2
Contract Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Vice President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Manager (unspecified) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Director of Professional Relations,
Information, Public Information,
Liaison, etc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Marketing Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Director (unspecified) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Medicaid Rebate Analyst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
No Answer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Survey Returns:
Returns were collected in the Department of Pharmacy
Practice, Fogarty Hall, University of Rhode Island.

A count

of envelopes returned per day was kept for reference.
Returns were then placed in large envelopes separated by day

13

of receipt and held for analysis.
There were no "undeliverable" returned by the Post
Office.

This reflects well on the accuracy and currency of

the list selected.

One envelope was received in error:

was a return to another survey.

it

Apart from that there were

four surveys considered unusable because respondents
indicated they were unfamiliar with OBRA '90 rebates, there
were no blank returns and no refusals.
Envelopes were opened carefully by hand.
and survey was then keyed alike.

Each envelope

Keying ensures that recon-

struction of respondents complete package is available
should the editing procedure raise any questions that need
to be answered.

It also preserved data in useable form

should it need revisiting for any purpose.

This keying was

necessary as the survey was conducted with a promise of
strict dentiality.

Respondents were promised no hidden

identifiers were included, as in fact, none were.

So keying

had to be accomplished as a separate process after return.
At this time postmarks appearing on the envelopes were
recorded on the corresponding survey.

Collecting these

postmarks, then, was an exercise in proper procedure and to
verify that the location of responders was not limited to
any particular region or locale.
satisfactory.

Variety of postmarks was

However, the U.S. Post Office did not post

mark all envelopes.

While postmarks have some uses in mail

surveys, none will be made for the purpose of this analysis
for reasons of confidentiality.

14

The completed questionnaires were then edited to
improve the accuracy and clarity of answers and help eliminate inconsistencies and obvious wrong or ambiguous replies.
For instance, if a respondent in an auto owners survey
answers that he does not have a car but then in subsequent
questions goes on to describe its color, insurance, number
of miles driven, monthly payment, pride of ownership, etc.,
then a researcher can justify recording the respondent as an
owner.

In this case the editor would reason that respondent

checked "do not own car" by error because that answer would
be inconsistent with data collected in following questions.
This editing reduces any imperfections to a minimum and
ensures the fullest possible use of the survey returns.

As

the questionnaires returned were very well completed the
amount of editing required was negligible.
Hypotheses:
The research attempted to explore the following
hypotheses:
Hl. That most manufacturers on the State of Rhode
Island bid list are familiar with the OBRA '90 mandated
Medicaid rebate requirements.
H2. That most manufacturers are participating in the
OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates.
H3. That most manufacturers will continue to
participate or will begin to participate in the OBRA
'90 mandated Medicaid rebates in the near term (one
year).
H4. That a majority of manufacturers will expect to
lose some Gross Profit margin as a result of furnishing
Medicaid rebates to each state Medicaid plan.

15

HS. That a reduction in profits because of the OBRA
'90 mandated Medicaid rebates will be perceived as
causing a reduction in funds available to support
research.
H6. That the following effects will occur in drug bid
acquisitions:
H6a: That OBRA '90 mandated rebates to one
segment of the pharmaceutical market are likely to
have the effect of exerting an upward influence on
prices available to buyers other than Medicaid.
H6b: That all purchasers do not necessarily pay
the same price for pharmaceuticals.
H6c: That OBRA '90 will not cause all purchasers
to receive the same price.
H6d: That while a "best price" will be known and
established in order to calculate the Medicaid
rebate amounts, it will not be made generally
available to buyers to serve as a reference tool
or benchmark against which they might judge the
success of their acquisitions.
H6e: That OBRA '90 will diminish manufacturers
ability to offer low bid prices on innovator drugs
to competitive bid acquisitions.
H6f: That OBRA '90 will diminish manufacturers
ability to offer low bid prices on generic drugs
to competitive bid acquisitions.
H6g: That if a competitive procurement group's
acquisition can become classified as an "exempt
award" and, therefore, not a factor to be
considered in the Medicaid "best price" rebate
calculations, this will result in lower prices
being offered.
Analysis:
Respondents were classified according to their answers
to classification questions thirteen through sixteen.

Then,

questionnaire responses were tabulated by taking the total
number of responses for each fixed alternative for each
question.

Responses were then cross-tabulated by respondent
16

group as each identified themselves in the classification
questions.

Finally, responses were cross-tabulated both as

a percentage within class and as a total response among all
classifications in order to provide an overall sense of
response to each question.

Results are reported later in

this work.
Statistical Tests:
Regrettably, testing must be done in the aggregate, as
response was not sufficient to test the cross tabs.
There are two statistical tests appropriate to this
work; they are the Binomial Sign Test of a proportion and
the Chi Square "goodness of fit" test.

These tests are

appropriate to these data characteristics of small sample
size, nonrandom population and discrete values.

These tests

are robust, distribution free nonparametric tests, as such,
it is not necessary to assume a normal distribution of the
sample population.
The Binomial Test:
The binomial formula:
p(x)

=

(n)
(x)

p

x

(1-p)

n-x

is used where p (probability) = .5, indicating a random
binomial distribution, and n

=

trials and a significance

level, alpha, as close as possible to .05 is used to test
the hypothesis.

Because the binomial distribution is a

discrete, noncontinuous distribution, a rejection region is

17

found giving the significance level closest to .OS (S%
significance level).

If the value of the test statistic

falls in the rejection region the Null Hypothesis is
rejected, the Alternate Hypothesis is accepted and,
therefore, statistical significance is accepted.
Null Hypothesis:

The distribution of responses observed is

a random distribution.
Alternate Hypothesis:

A statistically significant

preference is exhibited by the responses.
Chi Square "goodness of fit " Test:
This test requires two assumptions:
1.

All expected frequencies are at least one.

2.

At most, 20% of the expected frequencies are less

than S.
Formula:
Chi Square= Sigma (O - E)(O-E)/E
Where O represents the observed frequency and E represents
the expected frequency.

Expected frequency is calculated.

Expected Frequency = np
where n is the number of trials and p is the probability for
the category and at a S% significance level (alpha = .OS) ·
and degrees of freedom (df) = k - 1 where k is the number of
categories.
obtained.

Using the df at alpha = .OS a critical value is
If the value of the test statistic calculated

(Chi Square) is less than the critical value, do not reject
18

the Null Hypothesis.

If Chi Square is greater than the

value of the test statistic, accept the Alternate
Hypothesis.
Null Hypothesis:

The distribution of responses is random.

Alternative Hypothesis:

A statistically significant

preference is exhibited by the responses.

19

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

(
Classification:

Respondents were classified in three categories
according to their answers to questions 13, 14 15 and 16.
For the purposes of this research the categories were
defined as follows:
Innovator Manufacturer:

a company that manufactures or

markets a prescription drug whose original patent rights are
still in force.

Such a drug may not be manufactured without

permission of the patent holder by submission to the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) of a proper Abbreviated New
Drug Application (ANDA).
Generic Manufacturer:

a company that manufactures generic

drugs but does not presently manufacture or market any
innovator drugs.
Generic Drug:

multi-source drugs whose exclusive

patent rights have expired and with proper application
to the FDA may be made by various pharmaceutical
manufacturers.

Also called "noninnovator multiple

source drugs".
"Other":

Companies qualified on the bid list but

identifying themselves through classification questions as
not being manufacturers.

Possible examples include

wholesalers, repackagers, distributors, etc.
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Results of Classification of Respondents:
innovator manufacturers:

15

(62.5 %)

generic manufacturers:

4

(16.7 %)

"other":

5

(20.8 %)

For the purposes of this research, respondents were
classified as innovator manufacturers if they responded to
classification questions by indicating that they were
manufacturers who marketed at least one drug protected by
exclusive patent either through their own discovery and/or
by license agreement.

Manufacturers were classified as

generic if they indicated that they were manufacturers and
did not have any drugs protected by exclusive patent.
"Others" were respondents whose classification questions
indicated that they were neither innovator manufacturers nor
generic manufacturers, but were qualified on the bid list.

Base = 24

Question #1:
1.

Are you familiar with the Medicaid rebate requirements

mandated by the OBRA '90, sometimes referred to as the
Medicaid Prudent Purchaser Requirement?
1.

( )yes

2.

3.

)no
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( ) not sure
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Results:
Table One

ANS:
( 1)

#

INNOVATOR
MFR.
#
( %)

GENERIC
MFR.
( %)
#

15 ( 9 3 . 8 )

4

(100)

"OTHER"
#
( %)
5

(62.5)

TOTAL
( %)

#

24 (85.7)

(2 )

0

0

0

0

( 3)

0

0

0

0

no answer = 0
Statistical Tests:
A Binomial Sign Test was conducted with n trials
At an alpha value of .032, x
the Null is rejected.

=

24.

= 17, since observed x's = 24,

The responses exhibit a statistically

significant preference.
The results are statistically significant at an alpha
value of .000.
Fully 100% of respondents included in the analysis
indicated that they were aware of the OBRA '90 provisions.
All classes of respondents indicated an awareness of the
Act. This is encouraging because it indicates that a
knowledgeable audience has been reached.

These results

concur with Hypothesis 1:
---That most manufacturers on the State of
Rhode Island bid list are familiar with the
OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebate requirements.
From the literature search it was expected that bidders

24
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(

would be aware of the OBRA '90 provisions:

Various

hypotheses explored in this work, if supported, will show an
effect upon bidders' daily pricing activities.

In addition,

the potential market is large as the purchases funded by
Medicaid are estimated to be 10%
pharmaceutical market.

20

of the annual

Also, trade print media has been

active in the discussion of OBRA, its controversies and
repercussions in the marketplace.

Question #2:
2.

Base

=

24

Does your company participate in the Medicaid rebate

program?
1.

( )yes

2.

( ) no

( ) not sure

3.

Results:
Table Two:

ANS:
( 1)

#

INNOVATOR
MFR.
(%)
#

GENERIC
MFR.
( %)
#

#

"OTHER"
( %)

#

14 (93.3)

4 (100)

4 (80)

22 (91.7)

0

1 ( 2 0)

2

0

0

0

(2 )

1

( 3)

0

(6.7)

TOTAL
( %)

(8 . 3)

no answer = 0
Statistical Tests:
A Binomial Sign Test was conducted with n trials
At a p value of .032, x
Null is rejected.

=

17.

Since observed x's

=

=

22 the

The responses exhibit a statistically

26
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(

significant preference.
At a p level of .000 the results are statistically
significant.
An 91.7% of respondents indicated that they currently
participated in the Medicaid rebate program.

Among those

who identified themselves as manufacturers, 93.3% of
innovators and 100% of generic manufacturers said they
participated.
A majority, 80% of other category respondents also said
they were participants.

Only 8.3% of respondents overall

said that they did not participate in the OBRA '90 mandated
Medicaid rebates.

The majority response supports the

Hypothesis #2:
---That most manufacturers are participating in
the OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates.
One can reason that of the 20% of other respondents some are
likely to occupy market segments that are not affected by
·the OBRA '90 legislation since they are not manufacturers
according to their responses to the classification questions.
These individuals might be wholesalers, distributors, etc.,
who are entitled to be on the bid list but are not
manufacturers.

This can be further supported by the fact

that classification questions showed that 20.8% of
questionnaire respondents indicated that their company was
not a manufacturer of pharmaceuticals.

27
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Discussion of Results, Questions One and Two:
Questions one and two were designed to ease respondents
into the topic of OBRA '90 rebates by asking nonthreatening,
inoffensive questions in brief, straight - forward language.
This is highly recommended as a basic tenet of questionnaire
design by Churchill.

21

Innocuous, nonthreatening questions

placed at the beginning of questionnaires draw the
respondent in and convince him/her that involvement will be
brief and painless.

In theory, questions to be asked later

include those of more emotional or confidential issues
because the respondent is less likely to become annoyed with
sensitive issues and discard the questionnaire after some
time has been invested in answering the earlier questions.
In editing the answers to question number one, four
respondents indicated they were unaware of the OBRA '90
mandated Medicaid rebate requirements.
removed from the analysis of results.

These returns were
Tabulations for

question number two showed a very high rate of participation
among respondents overall at 91.7% and numbers in the
affirmative were (93.3% and 100%) among those classified as
innovator and generic manufacturers respectively.
High percentages of awareness and participation in the
OBRA '90 mandated rebates are consistent with the nature of
the list.

The list used was composed of active bidders on

the Rhode Island Pharmaceutical contracts, a sealed bid
format.

The list is continuously updated.

The edition of

the list used was accurate to March 10, 1992.
28

Active

oQ
"'1"

>
-Q)
..Y.
--

c

:::J

>
.._
Q)

>

C'·

oQ
(")
0)
Q)

.._
:::J

(/')

-c

oQ.

0

(")
C)

w~

->

w .£

Q)

..Y.

--

a:
-c
Io
I- u
0
I-.....,

II

I

a:~

J

<(~

I==

II

(.) ~
0

J:

>
>

29

bidders could be expected to have knowledge and participate
in the Medicaid rebates because Medicaid accounts for
approximately 10% of drug purchases nationwide

22

and

because, as hypothesized elsewhere in this work, the OBRA
'90 rebates will affect prices available to non-Medicaid
purchasers.

Vendors in such a price aggressive arena as

submitting sealed bids would likely be aware of the forces
that impact their ability to price competitively.

The OBRA

'90 rebates are a significant and much publicized
development in the media.

Question #3:
3.

Base

=

24

How likely is your company to begin and/or continue

participation within one year?
1.

2.
3.

)very likely
)likely
)not sure

)unlikely
)very unlikely

4.
5.

Results:
Table Three:

ANS:
( 1)

#

INNOVATOR
MFR.
( %)
#

GENERIC
MFR.
( %)
#

#

14 (93.3)

3 ( 7 5)

2 ( 4 0)

1 ( 2 5)

1 ( 2 0)

2

(8 . 3)

0

1 ( 2 0)

2

(8 . 3)

"OTHER"
( %)

#

TOTAL
( %)

19 (79.2)

(2)

0

( 3)

1

(4)

0

0

0

0

(5)

0

0

1 (20)

1 (4 . 2)

(6 .7)

no answer = 0
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Statistical Tests:
A Chi Square "goodness of fit" test is performed (see
also, Methodology) for the following hypotheses:
Null Hypothesis:

the responses equal random

distribution.
Alternate Hypothesis:

the responses differ from random

in a statistically significant fashion.
Chi Square is calculated:
Chi Square= Sigma (0-E)(O-E)/E
where E = np and degrees of freedom (df) is equal to k-1 and
a significance level of 5% is used (alpha= .05).
The value of the test statistic calculated as above for
question number three is 53.06.

The critical value of Chi

Square (.05) with df = 4 is 9.488.

The value of the test

statistic is greater than the critical value; therefore, the
Alternate Hypothesis is accepted.

The responses exhibit a

statistically significant difference from random.
A total of 79.2% of respondents indicated that they
were very likely to begin and/or continue participation in
the program of Medicaid rebates.

Combined affirmative

response, those selecting either likely or very likely, was
87.5%.

Previously in question number two, 91.7% of

respondents said their company was participating in the
Medicaid rebate program at the time of the questionnaire.
Question number three finds a possible (small) reduction in
participation with 87.5% of respondents answering that their
company will begin and/or continue participation.
31

In raw

(

scores this represents only one less response in the
affirmative.

The majority response of 87.5 % supported

hypotheses H2 and H3:
H2. ---That most manufacturers are participating
in the OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates.
H3. ---That most manufacturers will continue to
participate or will begin to participate in
the OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates in the
near term (one year).
Discussion:
Only 4.2 % of respondents were willing to say that they
were unlikely or very unlikely to begin and/or continue
participation.

The two responses to this question in the

"unsure" category (when added to the large number of
affirmative responses) show that the level of participation

is likely to continue to be high.

Furthermore, once

committed to participate in the rebate program a company is
likely to continue participation because the Medicaid
purchases are substantial, amounting to 10% of all
pharmaceuticals purchased annually in the United States

23

and a company is unlikely to ignore such a large market
segment.
The literature search led one to believe that a large
percentage of respondents would continue or begin the rebate
program and, in fact, 87.5 % intend to do so.

As mentioned

previously, the size of the Medicaid market makes it

32

important to people in the business of selling
pharmaceuticals.

In addition, manufacturers who participate

in the rebate program have all their drug products covered
by Medicaid and drugs that are new to the market will be
covered immediately and not have to wait until each state
accepts a particular drug into its Medicaid program.

As

reported by Coster:
"Drug manufacturers have significant incentives to
participate in the Medicaid rebate program since there
will be no federal matching funds available for the
drugs of those manufacturers that have not entered into
a rebate agreement.
However, manufacturers that have
rebate agreements in effect will have their products
covered by the state Medicaid programs.
This is a
significant victory for all the drug companies since
many states do not cover all the drug products of all
manufacturers due to cost and patient care reasons.
In
addition, there is usually a significant time lag
between the markets of a new drug and acceptance by a
state Medicaid program.
Now, all new drugs will have
to be covered immediately by a state Medicaid program
for a period of not less than six months after
approval.
All these benefits will have significant
"spill-over" effects on prescribing of a company's
products by physicians i2 other sectors of the
4
ambulatory care market."
Clearly, Coster makes a strong argument that it is in
manufacturers own best interests to participate.
Of respondents who said their company did not
participate, those companies may be nonparticipating
because their involvement in the pharmaceutical industry
may be as other than a manufacturer.

Responders who were

unsure or (very) unlikely to participate were composed
mostly (66.7%) of those classified as other than a generic
or innovator manufacturer.

While most respondents from

the selected universe sold pharmaceuticals that they
33

manufactured, the list is not restricted to manufacturing.
Other business entities that sell pharmaceuticals such as
wholesalers or repackers, to name but two possibilities, may
qualify for the list and can and do win bid acquisitions.
Not being manufacturers they would not participate as a
matter of course in the Medicaid rebate program.
Assessing question number three using just respondents
who classified themselves as generic or innovator
manufacturers, lends a much stronger impression of majority
response.

Responses for innovator and generic manufacturers

were 93.3% and 100% respectively that their companies would
continue and/or begin Medicaid rebates.
Clearly, most participants in the Medicaid rebates
expect to continue, and as show in question two, most are
participating now.

Thus, with continuing industry

participation, factors that this research show as likely to
be a result of changes instigated by OBRA '90 are likely to
remain factors in the marketplace in the near term.

Question #4:
4.

Base = 24

What effect, if any, do you think the Medicaid rebates

will have on the Gross Profit margin of your company's
pharmaceutical line?
1.

2.
3.

4.

)strong increase
)some increase
)no effect

5.

)some decrease
)strong decrease

If you answered 1, 2 or 3, please go to question number 6.
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CHART FOUR
Effect of rebates on gross profit?
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Results:
Table Four

ANS:

INNOVATOR
MFR.
#
( %)

#

GENERIC
MFR.
( %)
#

"OTHER"
#
( %)

#

TOTAL
( %)

( 1)

0

0

0

0

(2)

0

1 (25)

0

1

( 4. 2)

( 3)

0

1 (25)

0

1

( 4. 2)

1 ( 25)

3 ( 60)

17 (70.8)

1 ( 25)

2 ( 40)

4 (16.7)

13 (86.7)

(4 )

1

(5)
no answer

(6 . 7 )

1

Statistical Tests:
A Chi Square "goodness of fit" test is performed (see
also, Methodology) for the following hypotheses:
Null Hypothesis:

the responses equal random

distribution.
Alternate Hypothesis:

the responses differ from random

in a statistically significant fashion.
Chi Square is calculated:
Chi Square= Sigma (O-E)(O-E)/E
where E = np and degrees of freedom (df) is equal to k-1 and
a significance level of 5% is used (alpha= .05).
The value of the test statistic for question number
four as calculated above with n = 24 and p (probability)
0.2 is 41.8.
= 4 is 9.488.

The critical value of Chi Square (.05) with df
Since the value of the test statistic is

greater than the critical value the Alternate Hypothesis is
36
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accepted:

the responses exhibit a stat is t .i ca 11 y significant

preference.
87.5% of respondents predicted their company would
experience at least some decrease in Gross Prof it margin in
their pharmaceutical line.

Of the responders, 4 or 16.7%,

characterized the expected decrease as a strong decrease in
profit.

These results support the Hypothesis H4:

---That a majority of manufacturers will expect to
lose some Gross Profit margin as a result of
furnishing Medicaid rebates to each state Medicaid
plan.
Discussion:
This question branched respondents.

Those who expected

decreases were directed to question number five.

Others who

did not expect a decrease were directed to question number
six because if respondent did not expect a profit decrease
then question number five, concerning methods anticipated of
recovering profit loss, becomes irrelevant.
For 1992, OBRA '90 requires that manufacturers give
Medicaid a minimum rebate of 12.5% (see Appendix 3) of the
Average Manufacturers Price {AMP) or their "best price" to
any purchaser as defined by OBRA '90, subject to a cap of
50% of the AMP.

Estimates are that .

. "Medicaid's new

prudent purchasing legislation is expected to save federal
and state taxpayers from two to three point four billion
dollars over five years. 1125

Because of the dollars
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involved, it is expected that this program will have a
discernible effect on a company's gross profit, and that a
majority of respondents' opinions indicate that they
expected at least some decrease in gross profit.
by category were:

Responses

innovator manufacturers, 93.4%, some

measure of decrease; generic manufacturers, 50%, some
measure of decrease; and, "other", 100%, at least some
decrease.
Clearly, this response supports this hypothesis.

To

have billions of dollars removed by government fiat from an
industry should have some impact on profits.

And, in fact,

the anticipated dollar rebates for 1991 will exceed the
estimates according to a report in The Pipeline,
"Prescription drug expenditures for the 1991 Medicaid
program totaled $5.3 billion or $0.6 billion more than the
$4.7 billion that .

. (was)

. predicted for FY 1991.
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As Medicaid's total expenditure rises, the amount of funds
generated by the minimum 12.5% rebate rises.
A small number of respondents (4.2%) indicated that
they Medicaid rebates would have no effect on their
company's gross profit.

An equal number (4.2%) predicted

that their company would experience some increase in
profits.
An increase in profits is possible in some cases
because, although it seems obvious that the siphoning off of
funds in the form of Medicaid rebates would always decrease
the gross profit, there are some scenarios where a profit
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increase is possible.

For instance, as a compromise with

manufacturers, those who choose to participate in the
Medicaid rebate program will benefit from the fact "
(that)

. now all drugs will have to be covered

immediately by a state Medicaid program

II
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If a

manufacturer had some profitable drugs that were previously
excluded from Medicaid, their inclusion now might result in
an overall financial benefit.

Another area of possible new

profit is to manufacturers who have recently introduced or
are about to introduce new drugs.

Since OBRA '90 mandates

that participating manufacturers shall have all drugs
included for Medicaid coverage immediately upon introduction
to the general market, and state Medicaid approval can take
some time before a new entity is accepted for coverage, then
immediate coverage could present a new profit opportunity.
It is reasonable to accept the possibility that a small
percentage of respondents is anticipating increased profit
as a result of this law.

Question #5:
5.

Base = 19

Which of these strategies is your company most likely to

employ, other than price increases, to recover any profit
margins that might be reduced by supplying rebates to State
Medicaid programs?
1.

2.
3.

4.

)cut advertising
)expand markets
)cut mfr. costs

5.
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)reduce research
expenditure
)other

CHART FIVE
Which strategy most likely to recover $?
oxrand markets
'1 2 1%
c ut advertising
2 1.1%
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Results:
Table Five

ANS:

INNOVATOR
MFR.
( %)
#

#

GENERIC
MFR.
( %)
#

"OTHER"
( %)
#

#

TOTAL
( %)

( 1)

4 (26.7)

0

0

4 ( 21)

(2 )

5 (33.3)

1 (25)

2 (40)

8 (42.1)

(3)

1

1 (25)

0

2 ( 10. 5)

(4 )

3 ( 2 0)

0

1 (20)

4 ( 21)

(5)

6 ( 4 0)

0

1 ( 2 0)

7 (36.8)

no answer
Note:

(6 . 7)

6

total may add to more than 100% because of multiple
mentions.

Statistical Tests:
Chi Square "goodness of fit test":
Question number five requires a Chi Square test.
Regrettably, because of multiple responses this cannot be
done with the data available.

Re-tabbing the questionnaires

to eliminate multiple results in 16 useable responses, which
gives an expected frequency of 3.2 per cell.

Since it is

necessary to assume at least five responses per cell to
perform the Chi Square "goodness of fit test", the test
statistic would be highly unreliable.

That the Chi test

cannot be done because this necessary assumption cannot be
met, does not mean that the results are insignificant;
rather, it means that they cannot be adequately tested.
Statistical inferences regarding the population may not be
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drawn from these results; what follows is a report of
responses.
Question number five was asked only of those
respondents who indicated in question number four
that they expected their company to experience some
measure of Gross Profit margin decrease because of
the mandated Medicaid rebates.

The remaining 79.2% of

the respondents, therefore, completed question number
five.
The most frequent response to this question was
expansion of markets at 42.1%, followed closely by "other"
at 36.8%.

While 21% of the respondents felt that their

company would cut advertising, an equal number, 21%, said
their company would reduce research expenditure.

The option

with the lowest response was to cut manufacturing costs
(10.5%).
In summary, 21% of all those polled supported
Hypothesis HS:
-- - That a reduction in profits because of the
OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates will cause
a reduction in funds available to support
research.
Discussion:
The responses to question number five were too few to
support statistical analysis.

It may be of interest,

however, to examine the proportions of responses in relation
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to opinions expressed in the literature.

Published

sentiments implied that research expenditures were huge and
that a reduction in revenues caused by the OBRA '90 rebates
would have the effect of diminishing funds available for
research:
"
. the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
(PMA) estimates that in 1992, $10.9 billion will be
invested in R & D which would be 13.5% more than the
1991 expenditure of $9.6 billion.
The industry's
investment in R & D has been increasing at a greater
rate than its sales . . . but the number of new
chemical entities developed through the years has
been decre29ing due to the increased cost of
research."
and:
"
. the pharmaceutical industry invests the
highest percentage of annual sales in R & D
29
compared to other research-intensive industries."
One reason that if all innovator manufacturers on
the mailing list responded, there would be a greater
percentage of responses predicting an impact on research
and development dollars available in the future.

If

innovator manufacturers are more likely to have research
facilities than other classes of respondents, it is
possible that the effect on research programs is greater
than the survey results suggest since only 62.5% of
respondents classified themselves as innovator
manufacturers.
Question number five was designed to ask about price
increases without introducing bias by being inflammatory
and to see if anticipated gross profit loss would affect
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research funding.

It was felt that directly asking

respondents if they were going to "raise prices to everyone
else" would sensitize the issue.

Such price questions to an

industry that is currently receiving unfavorable accounts in
the media about prices would likely be inflammatory.
Instead, respondents were asked if they were contemplating
other strategies to recoup lost profit margins due to
Medicaid rebates.

"Reduce research expenditure" was one of

the closed end choices.
It was anticipated that a significant number of.
respondents would feel that research funding would be
diminished as one of the historic reasons cited for high
prescription drug prices is the claimed enormous cost of
funding drug research, prof its must be generated to pay
research and development costs (reputedly 230 million
dollars per drug, see below).

As Gerald J. Mossinghoff

(President of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association)
' has stated:
"The research-based pharmaceutical industry invests
17% of sales in R & D . . . this commitment to
research will result in future breakthrough drugs
.the proposals advanced by Senator David Pryor
would 3 early dampen the incentives to innovate

. . . 0
11

Because it is a prestige issue, and, therefore,
possibly sensitizing to respondents, no classification
questions were included in the questionnaire regarding
research facilities.

Therefore, it is not possible to
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tabulate responses according to size and success of research
facilities.

If a 100% response to the questionnaire was

received and all innovator manufacturers were tabulated
separately, such a tabulation might allow more accurate
conclusions about the impact of OBRA '90 on research and
development dollars.
While one cannot make inferences on the basis of 15
respondents, that any innovator manufacturers would expect
to reduce research dollars is worthy of note.

The cost of

developing a new pharmaceutical and bringing it to market is
large,
"
. R & D spending has continued to increase until
it now costs approximately $230 million to develop 31
product to the point of submitting an N.D.A . . . . "
An 20% of innovator respondents indicated that there
will be some reduction · in funds available to support
research as a result of the OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid
rebates.

Historically, innovator manufacturers, with their

generous research and development budgets have been
responsible for most of the breakthroughs in new pharmaceuticals and families of new pharmaceutical entities.

Question #6:
6.

Base

=

24

Some purchasers believe that mandated discounts to

Medicaid have exerted upward pressure on the prices of
pharmaceuticals available to the public through channels
other than Medicaid; what is your opinion?
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CHART SIX
Have rebates increased costs to buyers?

agree s tron g I y
29.2 %

"'°

O'\

nqrno

di sag r ee s tr ong ly
8 .3%
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op inion
12.C)%

1.

2.
3.

)agree strongly
)agree
)no opinion

4.
5.

)disagree
)disagree strongly

Results:
Table Six

ANS:

#

INNOVATOR
MFR.
#
( %)

GENERIC
MFR.
( %)
#

"OTHER"
( %)
#

#

7 (29.2)

TOTAL
( %)

( 1)

5 ( 33. 3)

1 ( 25)

1 ( 2 0)

(2 )

7 (46.7)

2 ( 5 0)

3 (60)

( 3)

1

1 ( 25)

1 (20)

3 ( 12. 5)

(4 )

0

0

0

0

(5)

2 (13.3)

0

0

2

no answer

( 6. 7)

12 ( 50)

( 8. 3)

0

Statistical Tests:
A Chi Square "goodness of fit" test is performed (see
also, Methodology) for the following hypotheses:
Null Hypothesis:

the responses equal random

distribution.
Alternate Hypothesis:

the responses differ from

random in a statistically significant fashion.
Chi Square is calculated:
Chi Square= Sigma (O-E)(O-E)/E
where E = np and degrees of freedom (df) is equal to k-1 and
a significance level of 5% is used (alpha

.05).

The value

of the test statistic calculated as above for question
number six with

n = 24 and (probability) p = 0.2 is 20.28.
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The critical value of Chi Square (.05) with df = 4 is 9.488.
Since the value of the test statistic is greater than the
critical value, the Alternate Hypothesis is accepted:

the

responses exhibit a statistically significant preference.
An 79.2% of all respondents felt that mandated Medicaid
discounts have exerted upward pressure on prices (50% agree;
29.2% agree strongly).

Thus, a majority support the

Hypothesis H6A:
---That the OBRA '90 mandated rebates to one segment
of the pharmaceutical market will have the effect
of exerting an upward influence on prices available
to buyers other than Medicaid.
Conversely, only 8.3% of respondents took the opposite view
and disagreed (strongly) that the mandated Medicaid rebates
have exerted upward pressure on prices available to other
market segments.

Only 12.5% selected no opinion on this

question.
Discussion:
.I n interpreting the significance of the response to
this question, it must be acknowledged as a source of bias
that manufacturers might find it convenient to blame the
government regulations for some of the major price increases
described in the media.
A counter argument to this bias is to note that the
only two responses that disagreed (disagree strongly) with
the notion that Medicaid rebates exerted upward pressure on
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pharmaceutical prices were from the innovator group.

These

responses are significant because they are contrary to the
standard "party line" which seeks to avoid blame for price
increases.

This dissent, then, tends to support the premise

that respondents' answers are unbiased in that respondents
seem to answer with their own opinion rather than an
association public relations line.
Respondents clearly feel that upward pressure on their
drug prices has been exerted by the OBRA '90 mandated
Medicaid rebates and this agrees with published comments.
This finding was in keeping with the hypothesis that
artificial downward pressure on prices to a particular
segment would result in compensating upward pressures to
other segments or a "cost shifting."

It can be reasoned

that manufacturers would not willingly become less price
competitive in the absence of upward pressure provided by
OBRA '90.
Did the OBRA '90 mandated rebates cause price increase
to other buyers?

Many anecdotal reports of drug price

increases of up to three times the rate of inflation and
caused by the OBRA '90 mandated rebates have appeared in the
professional print media.

For instance, "according to ASHP

(American Society of Hospital Pharmacists)
survey)

(their

. confirms what it predicted last year, that the

law would have the unintended effect of raising drug costs
to hospitals, HMO's, and community health centers. 1132

The

ASHP says their poll has received reports of hospitals and
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nonprofit organizations experiencing major price increases.
The many articles suggest a consensus that the Medicaid
rebates have sparked, either fairly or unfairly, large price
hikes in bid and contract purchasing.
has characterized the situation as, ".

Senator David Pryor
. numerous

confirmed reports that some drug manufacturers are in the
process of reducing discounts .

. breaking long term

contracts, and refusing to negotiate in good faith over
price"

33

Of course, reducing or eliminating deep discounts

historically available to competitive procurement has the
same effect as raising the price to those purchasers.

If

one customarily receives a 40% discount and suddenly is
given only a 15% discount on drug purchases, that would
cause a significant increase in drug acquisition cost.
The upward pressure of mandated Medicaid rebates . has
been reasoned and articulated as follows by Cano:
. "Economic realities suggest there is a strong
likelihood that major manufacturers will shift costs
to private payer3 as a result of the proposal's
4
implementation."
Another source that continues in this vein is a report
of topics discussed at the American Pharmaceutical
Association (APhA) annual meeting.

The report

sa~d:

. "Pharmaceutical manufacturers are said to be
raising prices to other purchasers, including other
government agencies, jg recover the discounts being
offered to Medicaid."
Because of published statements such as these, it is
expected that the majority of responses would blame the OBRA
'90 rebates at least somewhat for these reported price
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hikes.

In conformance with this, 79.2% of respondents

agreed or agreed strongly that mandated Medicaid discounts
have exerted upward pressure on prices.

Only 8.3% of the

respondents opposed, indicating they did not believe the
OBRA '90 rebates

ex~rted

upward pressure on pharmaceutical

prices available to the public through channels other than
Medicaid.

On this issue, 12.5% expressed no opinion at the

time of the questionnaire.
Provision of the mandated Medicaid discounts will cause
manufacturers to raise prices in other market segments.
This upward pressure will also affect group bid
acquisitions; and questions ten and eleven will examine this
issue specifically.

Question #7:
7.

Base

=

24

Which of the following drug purchasers, in general,

currently receives your lowest price for your single and/or
multiple source innovator drugs?
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

)Medicaid
)hospital
)Ind. pharmacy
)State Govt.
)buying group

6.
7.
8.
9.

10.
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(Check one).
)Veterans Administration
)chain pharmacy
)wholesaler
)none of these
)all buyers/same price-Go To Question #9.

CHART SEVEN
Which buyer receives your lowest price?
Vot o rnn s Adm .
5CJO%

none of these
4.2%
state government
4 .2%

Vl

N

Hospital
4 .2 %
wh olesaler

8 .3%
Mrnlic;iicJ
1f) (CJ)

-~. .
hllyir1~1

(may total

>

100%)

----....__ -·--

group

-- - -

L.---------

/\II buyer s / sa rno $
12.5%

Results:
Table Seven
INNOVATOR
MFR.
ANS:

#

#

( %)

GENERIC
MR.
#

"OTHER"
( %)

#

( %)

#

TOTAL
( %)

( 1)

2

(13.3)

0

2

(2)

1

( 6. 7)

0

0

1

( 3)

0

0

0

0

(4)

0

1 ( 2 5)

0

1

( 5)

2

(13.3)

1 ( 2 5)

0

3 (12.5)

(6)

9

( 60)

1 ( 2 5)

2

( 7)

0

0

0

0

(8 )

1

( 6. 7)

1 ( 2 5)

0

2

(8.3)

( 9)

1

(6. 7)

0

0

1

(4.2)

( 10)

1

(6. 7)

1 ( 25)

1 ( 2 0)

3 (12.5)

(40)

( 4 0)

4 (16.7)

12

(4 . 2 )

(4.2)

(SO)

no answer
0
double mentions = l*
triple mentions
l*
*NOTE:

some totals may equal more than 100% because of
multiple mentions.

Statistical Test:
This question is tested in the binomial form, do you
charge all purchasers the same price?
A Binomial Sign Test was conducted with n trials
At an alpha value of .032, x
the null is rejected.

=

17.

Since observed x's

=
=

24.
21,

The responses exhibit a statistically

significant preference.

53

The results are significant at an alpha value of .0001.
Discussion:
Question number seven was designed to test Hypothesis
H6B:
---That all purchasers do not necessarily pay the
same price for pharmaceuticals.
The wide variations in response support the premise
that prices do vary among purchasers because many different
respondents indicated many different groups of purchasers as
recipients of their lowest price.
The Veterans Administration was the price winner,
having been mentioned as receiving the lowest price 50% of
the time.

Interestingly, 12.5% of the respondents said all

their customers received the same price.

This was

unexpected as conventional wisdom accepts for granted that
different purchasers arrange unique pricing according to
competitive arrangements and bargaining ability:
II

. The characteristic of competitive market conditions

was found to significantly influence lowering of prices
offered to purchasing groups. 1136

These respondents were

excused from question number eight.
Medicaid was selected as low price by 16.7% of the
respondents.

It is impossible to know if that were true for

those respondents before the OBRA '90 act took effect.
However, since Senator David H. Pryor has maintained that
legislation creating the OBRA '90 rebates was necessary
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because ".
prices .

. Medicaid .
"37

(is)

. charged the highest

The argument can be made that this is the

effect of the OBRA '90 mandated rebates.

At the time of

questionnaire response, OBRA '90 mandated rebates had
already become active.
"best price."

OBRA '90 reserves to Medicaid the

Medicaid and Veterans Administration are not

mutually exclusive choices for low price because Veterans
Administration depot
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pricing is exempt from the "best

price" calculations and, therefore, a manufacturer can give
the depot a lower price than Medicaid and still give
Medicaid its OBRA '90-defined "best price".
Buying groups, companies like Vector, whose business it
is to negotiate (low) contract pricing with manufacturers
for clients such as hospitals, were selected by respondents
as receiving the lowest price 12.5% of the time while . State
Government, wholesalers, and "none of these" were each
selected by 4.2% of respondents.

Hospitals were said to

receive the lowest price from just 4.2% of respondents also.
No respondents said that either independent pharmacies or
chain pharmacies received their lowest price.
Question seven demonstrates that different segments of
the marketplace do receive different pricing for
pharmaceuticals and is appropriate to this work since this
thesis is in large part dedicated to exploring the effect of
the OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates on market segments
other than Medicaid in general and in particular the market
segment of pharmaceutical purchasing that is competitive bid
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purchasing.

In fact, different segments of the marketplace

receive very different prices.
The following attempts a brief explanation of some
aspects of pharmaceutical pricing.

Most people who think of

pharmaceuticals envision a neighborhood drug store.

Such

drug stores acquire their pharmaceuticals from a wholesaler.
They are charged a "wholesale price"; perhaps they receive
an additional discount from this price also, individual
arrangements vary greatly.

The wholesalers buy their

pharmaceuticals from a manufacturer; they pay less than
"wholesale."

The price wholesalers are charged, their

acquisition cost, is defined by OBRA '90 as the "Average
Manufacturers Price" (AMP).

Most of the other drug buyers

listed in question number seven employ various strategies in
an attempt to pay as little as possible for their
pharmaceuticals.

The mechanism most of these purchasers

employ to obtain better pricing, sometimes on their own
behalf and sometimes through buying services, is the
competitive bid.

Bids solicit price offers from

manufacturers using the force of competition to apply as
much leverage as possible in order to obtain better prices.
Some purchasers are more successful in obtaining low prices
than others.

This is a result of many factors, even the

type of purchaser, that is, hospital, nonprofit hospital,
charitable hospital, institution, charitable institution,
and so forth.

Some other more familiar factors might

include dollar volume, length of contract, return policy,
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etc., to name but a few variables.
the more

co~petition

In general, one can say

created for the available dollars, the

lower the prices, as found by Raehtz et al.:
"The characteristic of competitive market conditions
was found to significantly inf~~ence lowering of prices
offered to purchasing groups."
Among all these purchasers, the Veterans Administration
depot prices are reputed to be the lowest.

In fact, OBRA

'90 exempts the Veterans Administration acquisitions for the
following reason:
"
. the Federal government depot .
(low)
prices reflect the manufacturer's costs of delivering
the pro~tlct in bulk to a provider, without packaging
costs."
In line with such statements, the Veterans
Administration was selected most frequently, 50% of the
time, as receiving a respondent's lowest price.

Observing

the results in just innovator manufacturers the percentage
extending their lowest price to the Veterans Administration
was 60%.
In all, respondents made selections in eight separate
categories.

This is evidence that prices vary widely among

various market segments.

This supports the hypothesis that

all purchasers do not necessarily pay the same price for
pharmaceuticals.
Worthy of note is the result that the only two
categories that did not receive anyone's lowest price were
independent pharmacies and chain pharmacies.

Those units

most familiar to the average consumer do not receive
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CHART EIGHT
Is OBRA incentive to "one price" all?
no t s ur e

95 %
likely
14 .3%

U1

00

unli ke ly

very Ii kely
4 .8%

~H3 . 1 %

-------

--

-------

vn ry unlike ly
3~3.3 %

(

anyone's lowest price.

Additional evidence that prices vary

among purchasers is that pharmacy organizations have long
recognized these price variations and discussed this pricing
as a central topic to their business even to the point of
mobilizing to affect some change.

The National Association

of Retail Druggists (NARD) has introduced a resolution to
demand equal access to pricing for retail pharmacies and
describes the existence of "multi tier pricing" as .
source of most of independent pharmacies problems."

Question #8:
8.

Base

=

.

. "the
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If you did not check "same price", how likely do you

think that the OBRA legislation will provide an incentive to
your company to of fer the same price to all these
purchasers?
1.
2.
3.

)very likely
)likely
)not sure

)unlikely
)very unlikely

4.
5.

·Results:
Table Eight:

ANS:

#

INNOVATOR
MFR.
( %)
#
(6. 7)

GENERIC
MFR.
( %)
#

"OTHER"
#
( %)

#

( %)

0

0

1

( 4 . 8)

TOTAL

( 1)

1

(2)

2 (13.3)

1 ( 25)

0

3 ( 14. 3)

( 3)

1

1 (25)

0

2

(4 )

6 (40)

0

2 (37.5)

8 ( 38)

( 5)

4 (26.7)

1 ( 25)

2 ( 2 5)

7 (33.3)

no answer

( 6. 7)

1
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(9.5)

Statistical Test:
The Binomial Sign Test is used, "unsure" and no answers
are eliminated, therefore n

=

19.

The alpha value at 5%

significance is .031 for x

=

15, the Null is rejected.

A statistically significant

14.

Since the observed x's

preference is shown by the data.
The results are significant at an alpha value of .007.
Question number eight was asked of 21 eligible
respondents.

The largest group of respondents, 38%, thought

the OBRA '90 legislation was unlikely to provide an
incentive to charge all purchasers the same price and an
additional 33.3% thought that it was very unlikely.

That

is, a better than two-thirds majority (71.3%) support the
Hypothesis H6C:
---That OBRA '90 will not cause all purchasers to
receive the same price.
Only 19.1% of responders answered that the OBRA '90
legislation would likely or very likely provide an incentive
to charge all purchasers the same price.

Nine point five

percent (9.5%) of respondents stated they were unsure.
Discussion:
As of the date of response, the answers suggest that
there will be no mass move to single pricing as a result of
OBRA '90.

If single pricing became the norm, medical buyers

would save effort and overhead involved in price
negotiations.

The response suggests that medical buyers
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will still have to spend a great deal of effort, as well as
overhead dollars, making sure their clients/employers
receive the best price available to their market segment.
This means that later discussions in this work of OBRA '90's
effect on bid purchasing will remain relevant at least in
the near term.
Seventy-one point three percent (71.3%) of respondents
at the time of the questionnaire thought that the OBRA '90
was unlikely or very unlikely to provide an incentive to
charge all purchasers the same price.

This might be

expected as OBRA '90 was never meant to encourage uniform
pricing.

OBRA '90's purpose was to secure discounts on

pharmaceutical pricing for the Medicaid program.
The 12.5% of respondents to question seven who said
they charged all buyers the same price were directed to skip
this question.
A minority of respondents (19.1%) thought OBRA would
provide an incentive to charge all purchasers the same
price.

This sentiment has some support in the professional

media.

At the Northeast Pharmaceutical Conference, the Vice

President of Glaxo, the second largest manufacturer in sales
of pharmaceuticals, predicted the gap between the lowest and
the highest pharmaceutical prices will narrow as a result of
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, "We have to lower the
42
.
th e 1 ow price.
.
. h price
.
h ig
as we 11 as raise
Even if prices do get closer, however, they may not
necessarily become the same for all market segments.
61

This

is supported by the questionnaire results.

The continued

existence of varied pricing means that pharmaceutical buyers
will probably still rely on the bid system to obtain low
prices through competition.

As Lindsay has said regarding

competition:
"The available data indicate that there is much greater
price flexibility and price competition in the
pharmaceutical industry than has generally been
assumed. Competition in prices between several sets of
competing drugs has produced a downward trend 4 ~n
prices, relative to other consumer products."
To ensure this competition, bid instruments will still be a
valuable tool in market segments that previously relied on
competitive bid acquisitions.

Question #9:
9.

Base = 24

As the legislation requires a 12.5% discount from AMP or

a "manufacturers best price," how likely is your company to
publish these Medicaid prices, for example, in the company
catalog, the REDBOOK, etc., so that other groups may use
them as a reference?
1.

2.
3.

)very likely
)somewhat likely
)not sure

4.
5.
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)unlikely
)very unlikely

----..

CHART NINE
Will "best prices" be published?
unli ke l y
29.2 %

not sure
8 .3%
ver y like ly
4 .2%
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w

~

~

~-vrn v uni i ke l y
not answering • 1

5 11 2%

-
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Results:
Table Nine:

ANS:

#

INNOVATOR
MFR.
( %)
#

GENERIC
MFR.
( %)
#

"OTHER"
( %)
#

TOTAL
( %)
#

( 1)

0

1 ( 25)

0

1

(2 )

0

0

0

0

(3)

2 (13.3)

0

0

2

(4)

1

3 ( 75 )

3 ( 6 0)

7 (29.2)

0

2 (40)

13 ( 54. 2)

( 6. 7)

11 (73.3)

(5)
no answer

(4 . 2 )

(8 . 3)

1

Statistical Tests:
A Chi Square "goodness of fit" test is performed (see
also, Methodology) for the following hypotheses:
Null Hypothesis:

the responses equal random

distribution.
Alternate Hypothesis:

the responses differ from

·random in a statistically significant fashion.
Chi Square is calculated:
Chi Square= Sigma (O-E)(O-E)/E
where E = np and degrees of freedom (df) is equal to k-1 and
a significance level of 5% is used (alpha= .05).

The test

statistic for question number nine is calculated as above
with n = 23 and (probability) p = 0.2.
test statistic is 20.6.

The value of the

The critical value of Chi Square

(.05) with df = 4 is 9.488.

Since the value of the test

statistic is greater than the critical value, the Alternate
64

Hypothesis is accepted:

the responses exhibit a

statistically significant preference.
A majority (83.4%) of respondents said their company
was unlikely or very unlikely to publish their Medicaid
prices.

This majority supports the Hypothesis H6D:

---That while a "best price" will be known and
established in order to calculate the Medicaid
rebate amounts, it will not be made generally
available to buyers to serve as a reference tool
or benchmark against which they might judge the
success of their acquisitions.
Of the 83.4% who responded in this fashion, fully 54.2% of
the total respondents qualified their answer as very
unlikely that their company would publish the prices.

Only

one respondent to the questionnaire thought that his company
would publish the prices, while 8.3% of respondents were
unsure.
Discussion:
It is easily understood on the basis of competition
that manufacturers would prefer their prices to remain
confidential.

However, it removes the potential of, for

instance, the State of Rhode Island accepting the U.S.
Government price or that price plus a negotiated or bid
"markup" as the contract price for the manufacturers
pharmaceuticals.

Accepting such a "Government Price" would

save much work and expense by circumventing the formal bid
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process.

One of the elements needed to do this is,

according to Rhode Island State Purchasing practices, a
satisfactory industry-wide verifiable price listing to be
used as baseline.

Perhaps, if it were widely available, the

Medicaid "best price" could be that missing element.
Historically, such information has been closely held by
manufacturers even when testifying before Senate
subcommittees.

In an interview published in February 1990,

Senator David H. Pryor enters into a discussion of the
price of pharmaceuticals, especially as it relates to
Medicaid pricing, and the reluctance of the drug industry to
testify before Pryer's committee regarding price, profits,
cost of development, etc.

An especially contentious issue

between Pryor and the drug companies is the appearance of
what is described as ever escalating drug prices and the
refusal of manufacturers to surrender their records to
44
.
. f y t h eir
. nee d to c h arge h.ig h er prices.
.
JUSti

Viewed in

this light, it is surprising that any respondents would
think that their company would publish sensitive price data.
Respondents who answered unsure may be reflecting the
opinion that with the federal government involvement through
OBRA '90 that confidentiality might be impossible.

For

instance, though it does not state that pricing data will be
disclosed, the OBRA legislation does provide:
''
. That a report on pricing for prescription drugs
purchased by the Department of Veterans Affairs, other
federal programs, community and hospital pharmacies,
and other purchasing groups and managed care plans will
be submitted to several designated congressional
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committees. 1145
This misunderstanding, if indeed present, might have been
eliminated if the question had asked respondents to state
their company's preference regarding the publication of
prices.

For example, "does you company favor publishing

these Medicaid prices and/or unit rebates, total rebates,
etc:", the response might have been closer to a unanimous
negative.
The 83.4 % response is supportive of the hypothesis and
could possibly even understate respondents' desire to keep
price information confidential.

The response also

illustrates, it is highly unlikely that pharmaceutical
buyers will be able to employ any shortcuts in their bid
acquisitions such as may have been provided by the
publication of the prices supplies to Medicaid.

Question #10:

Base = 24

***Many segments of the pharmaceutical market practice
competitive procurement, that ls, sealed bids, contract
purchasing, buying groups and so forth.

The following

questions are designed to assess how this legislation will
impact the prices your company will offer to these groups.
10.

Because of the OBRA '90 legislation, my company's

ability to extend special pricing to competitive procurement
groups for single and/or multi - sourced innovator drugs will
be .
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CHART TEN
Ability to price low innovator drugs?
no t a ff ec te d
33.3 %

O'I

co

r I 1 : ( : r n ;i ~; n cJ
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~------ -not answering • 1

g reatly d ec r easGd
20.8%

----------

1.
2.
3.

)greatly increased
)increased
)not affected

4.
5.

)decreased
)greatly decreased

Results:
Table Ten:

ANS:

#

INNOVATOR
MFR.
( %)
#

GENERIC
MFR.
#
( %)

#

"OTHER"
( %)

TOTAL
#

( %)

( 1)

0

0

0

0

(2 )

0

0

0

0

(3)

5 (33.3)

2 ( 50)

1 ( 2 0)

8 (33.3)

(4 )

6 ( 4 0)

0

4 ( 80)

10 (41.7)

( 5)

3 ( 2 0)

2 ( 5 0)

0

5 (20.8)

no answer = 1
Statistical Tests:
A Chi Square "goodness of fit" test is performed (see
also, Methodology) for the following hypotheses:
Null Hypothesis:

the responses equal random

distribution.
Alternate Hypothesis:

the responses differ from

random in a statistically significant fashion.
Chi Square is calculated:
Chi Square= Sigma (O-E)(O-E)/E
where E = np and degrees of freedom (df) is equal to k-1 and
a significance level of 5% is used (alpha = .OS).

The value

of the test statistic calculated as above with n = 23 and
(probability) p = 0.2 is 18.07%.
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The critical value of Chi

Square (.05) with df

=

4 is 9.488.

Since the value of the

test statistic is greater than the critical value, the
Alternate Hypothesis is accepted:

the responses exhibit a

statistically significant preference.
Most (62.5%) of respondents through their company's
ability to extend special pricing to competitive procurement
groups for innovator drugs would be either decreased or
greatly decreased by OBRA '90.

The majority, then, support

the Hypothesis H6A:
- -- That OBRA '90 mandated rebates to one segment of
the pharmaceutical market will have the effect of
exerting an upward influence on prices available
to buyers other than Medicaid.
Thirty- three point three percent (33.3%) thought this
ability would not be affected, while 4.2% did not answer.
Discussion:
It was anticipated that a very large number of
respondents would indicate that OBRA '90 mandated discounts
to Medicaid would cause price increases to other buyers
because Medicaid comprises 10% of the pharmaceutical market
in the United States and this is a significant market
portion.
As OBRA '90 reserves to Medicaid a substantial rebate
from the Average Manufacturers Price (AMP) or the
manufacturers "best price," whichever is less, the incentive
will be for manufacturers to stop offering deep discounts
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because:
"Medicaid accounts for a sizeable chunk- - perhaps 10% on
average--of their revenues.
Now that Medicaid will be
entitled to considerable rebates and eventually to the
"best price" available to other buyers, it's only
sensible for producer~ to protect their interests by
6
raising prices . . . "
Also, it is reasoned that forced discounts to Medicaid
will exert upward pressure on prices available to other
market segments as manufacturers attempt to maintain
profitability despite significant revenues being consumed by
rebates.

. an estimated 3.4 billion dollars over five

years .
While 62.5% is not as large a majority as might have
been expected, in light of such statements, it is still a
considerable majority.

Answers here may be skewed by the

actual products of each manufacturer and by complex
marketing decisions made at each corporate headquarters.

A

manufacturer with several innovator drugs, unique to their
market niche, would be less affected by OBRA '90 because
such a product line does not sell strictly on the basis of
price and the manufacturer is under less price competitive
pressure.

That is, when a therapeutically unique drug (not

substitutable) is indicated because of clinical
considerations, for example, potency, lack of side effects,
compatibility, etc., price is removed as a consideration
from prescribing and purchasing.

A manufacturer who enjoys

such a technologically superior product line is less
inclined to discount to various purchasers and would likely
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be less affected by the need to provide bids to purchasing
groups who are looking for the lowest prices.
There is another area of consideration that may have
lowered the majority percentage.

Those respondents,

(12.5%), to question number seven who said their company
charged all buyers the same price.

If, for any reason, a

manufacturer gives little or no discount to states,
hospitals, bid groups, etc., in the first place, then the
OBRA '90's effect on a manufacturers group procurement
policies would be diminished.

In the case of these vendors

who stated they charged everyone the same price, OBRA '90
could be expected to affect their bidding performance only
minimally.

Their answers, if consistent, may account for

some of the 33.3% who maintained that their ability to
extend special pricing to competitive bid groups would be
unaffected.

This fact tends to understate the majority

support of this hypothesis (6A).
How do OBRA '90 rebates influence bid prices?
mechanics of this effect may be as follows.

The

Before OBRA

'90, a manufacturer in a competitive situation, a bid for
instance, could charge whatever (low) price it chose.

If it

wished to pursue business in a certain sector, a teaching
hospital, for example, it might set a very low price,
perhaps even below cost.

OBRA '90, by requiring

manufacturers to rebate a percentage of AMP or extend the
manufacturers "best price" to Medicaid, whichever is lower,
discourages deep discounts.

A manufacturer who captures
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some business by entering a low bid to a competitive
purchasing market segment may have to reduce its Medicaid
price below what would have been the discounted AMP amount.
Then, it can be reasoned, OBRA '90's "best price" to
Medicaid bars nongovernment and nonexempt buyers from
receiving a price that is lower.

The majority of

respondents, which may in fact be understated, have answered
that OBRA '90 has diminished their ability to extend special
pricing to competitive procurement groups.
Questions ten and eleven were asked of the entire
sample.

Those answering that they charged all buyers the

same price in question seven, 12.5%, could have answered
accurately that OBRA '90 would have no effect on their
ability to extend special pricing as they apparently do not
pursue this kind of business.

While it is appropriate to

include these respondents to study if their ability would
change, their inclusion in this analysis also lowers the
number who said OBRA '90 would affect their ability to
extend special pricing.
In addition, some of those respondents who have been
classified as other than innovator or generic manufacturer
may be wholesalers, or unit dose distributors, or businesses
who may not be involved in competitive bid processes.
Wholesalers, while they may be active bidders, are
unaffected by legislation that requires rebates from
manufacturers and would accurately describe themselves as
unaffected.
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In question two, it was seen that 8.3% of all
respondents did not participate in the rebate program.
Non - participants in the rebate program would also be
unaffected by OBRA '90.
Another factor that lowers the majority result is the
manufacturers product line.

Question ten relates

specifically to innovator drugs.

Any respondents who market

drugs, but not innovator drugs, that is, a generic
manufacturer, would appropriately respond that they were not
affected.
Finally, it is important to note that no one said they
expected the OBRA '90 legislation to allow increased ability
to extend special pricing.
For all these reasons then, the 62.5% response that
expected a decrease in the ability to extend special pricing
adequately supports the hypothesis that purveyors of
innovator drugs are less able to extend special prices to
·competitive procurement groups because of OBRA '90
legislation.

Question #11:
11.

Base

=

24

Because of the OBRA legislation, my company's ability

to extend special pricing to competitive procurement
groups for generic drugs (multi-sourced, non-innovator) will
be .
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1.

(

2.
3.

)greatly increased
)increased
) not affected

4.

)decreased
)greatly decreased

5.

Results:
Table Eleven:

ANS:

#

INNOVATOR
MFR.
( %)
#

GENERIC
MFR.
( %)
#

#

TOTAL

"OTHER"
( %)

#

( %)

( 1)

0

0

0

0

(2 )

0

0

0

0

(3)

7 (46.7)

2 ( 50)

2 ( 4 0)

11 (45.8)

(4)

5 (33.3)

2 ( 50)

3 ( 60)

10 (41.7)

(5)

2 (13.3)

0

0

2

(8 . 3)

no answer = 1
Statistical Tests:
A Chi Square "goodness of fit" test is performed (see
also, Methodology) for the following hypotheses:
Null Hypothesis:

the responses equal random

distribution.
Alternate Hypothesis:

the responses differ from random

in a statistically significant fashion.
Chi Square is calculated:
Chi Square= Sigma (O-E)(O-E)/E
where E = np and degrees of freedom (df) is equal to k-1 and
a significance level of 5% is used (alpha

.05).

The value

of the test statistic calculated as above with n = 23 and
(probability) p = 0.2 is 25.91.
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The critical value of Chi

(

Square (.05) with df

=

4 is 9.488.

Since the value of the

test statistic is greater than the critical value, the
Alternate Hypothesis is accepted:

the responses exhibit a

statistically significant preference.
At the time of questionnaire response, 45.8% of those
responding said that their ability would not be affected
while 50% thought their ability would be either decreased or
greatly decreased.

For generic drugs then, exactly one half

of respondents support the hypothesis H6A:
---That OBRA '90 mandated rebates to one segment
of the pharmaceutical market will have the
unwanted effect of exerting an upward influence
on prices available to buyers other than
Medicaid.
Discussion:
Question eleven was asked of the entire sample.

There

are some factors, discussed previously in question ten,
which may have affected respondents answers so as to
understate the support for the hypothesis.

Factors that may

have increased the number of respondents selecting
unaffected are:
The entire sample was polled and this included
respondents who answered that they charged all buyers
the same price in question seven.
Some respondents classified as other may not be
manufacturers and thus not affected by OBRA '90.
Some responders may not supply special discounts to bid
acquisitions anyway.
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Those respondents in question two (8.3 %) who said
they did not participate in the rebate program would
be unaffected.
The percentage of respondents selecting unaffected is
45.8 %.

Some of this considerable number may have been due

to respondents who thought their ability to bid generic drug
prices would be unaffected because of internal policy
adjustments made in direct response to the OBRA '90 mandated
rebate provisions.

January 1991 was the effective date of

the OBRA '90 regulations.

Generic companies were required

by the provisions of OBRA '90 to rebate to Medicaid
suff i cient funds to result in a discount equivalent to 10 %
below the AMP, that is, 10% below what wholesalers pay for
drugs when they purchase them direct from the manufacturer
for resale to retailers.

The generic OBRA '90 rebate

probably served as incentive to manufacturers of generic
drugs to restructure their pricing strategies.
discounts may have been curtailed or eliminated.

Severe
Thus,

respondents may have been influenced by the time of
questionnaire response, June 1992.

Having previously made

what adjustments were possible, respondents might have been
influenced to answer that their ability would be unaffected
(future tense) as they answered the questionnaire in June
1992, meaning, in fact, since they had adjusted in calendar
1991 there would be no additional effect.

This could have

been el i minated if different verb tense had been used in the
question:

. "My company's ability to extend special

pricing to competitive procurement groups has been .
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II

This might have eliminated any possible confusion for those
responding.
Those who felt their ability to extend special pricing
would be decreased or greatly decreased comprised 50% of the
responses.

These responses may be understated by the

inclusions of those companies who charge all buyers the same
price as discussed in the previous question.

As

hypothesized, a forced discount to below wholesale prices
for Medicaid customers plus the potential for being forced
to supply at the "best price" level would disincline
manufacturers from bidding at price levels below that
obtained for Medicaid by calculating a fixed reduction from
wholesale acquisition cost.

Because if they did price below

those levels, "best price" requirements would force them to
match that price for Medicaid purchasers up to specified
OBRA '90 limits.

For example, if a generic manufacturer

bids a drug to the State of Rhode Island at a price of
$10.00, and the discounted price to Medicaid is $11.00, the
manufacturer must then make an additional rebate to Medicaid
of $1.00 for each unit.

The extra $1.00 would be provided

for each unit Medicaid purchased in each state.
Importantly, while the State of Rhode Island may have
purchased 100 units, Medicaid, in each state, may have
purchased thousands and must receive a rebate for each unit.
It is conceivable in this way that a manufacturer could end
up rebating many more dollars to Medicaid than it profited
by its sales to the State of Rhode Island, amounting to
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actually losing money.

Then it can be understood how

important it would be for a manufacturer not to sell at too
low a price to anyone but Medicaid.

This, in effect,

creates an artificial floor to bid prices because
manufacturers who price below this floor risk triggering the
"best price" mechanism of OBRA '90.

Large discounts,

historically available, cannot penetrate this floor without
causing potentially serious financial repercussions for the
manufacturer.
The numbers claiming that their ability would be
unaffected (45.8%) is greater than the number claiming no
effect in question ten (33.3%).

This may be a sign of an

obvious phenomenon, that generic drugs are more price
competitive than innovator drugs.

For example, if 100

manufacturers produce an acceptable quality Penicillin G and
many competitive procurers poll many vendors, the winning
price is likely to be very low as manufacturers compete in
this example strictly by price.
price vendor will win the bid.

Theoretically, the low
Wholesale prices will also

be low due to market pressure as wholesalers may choose one,
two or several vendors' Penicillin G to inventory, but not
all.

In this case wholesalers may exert downward pressure

on prices just as effectively as a competitive procurer can
with a bid instrument.

(Recall that the AMP is defined by

OBRA '90 as the price manufacturers charge wholesalers.)
So, if one accepts this idea of a very narrow trading range,
one can see that many multi-source products may have been in
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no danger of breaking through that "best price" floor.
Those responders who favor this view of the generic market
could be more likely to respond in the not affected
category.

That the generic drugs are considered more price

competitive can be seen in the OBRA '90 legislation which
requires smaller rebates on generic drugs than on brand name
innovator drugs (see Appendix 3).
Those who felt their ability to extend special pricing
would be decreased or greatly decreased comprised 50% of the
survey.

These responses were the expected majority.

Forced

discounts to below wholesale prices for Medicaid customers
plus the potential for being forced to supply at the "best
price" level should disincline manufacturers from bidding at
price levels below that obtained for Medicaid.

It was

reasoned that many respondents aware of this potential would
say that their ability to price (low) to competitive
procurement would be decreased in some degree.

The

existence of this "price floor" will affect the success of
competitive bid acquisitions in achieving low prices for
pharmaceuticals.

Question #12:
12.

Base = 24

OBRA '90 specifies that "single contract awards" and

"exempt awards" will not affect Medicaid rebate
calculations.

Assume a bid group can qualify their

acquisitions as such.

How likely is the group to obtain

better pricing from your company if the prices you offer are
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CHART TWELVE
If bidder exempt, will price be less?
so mewh CJ t like ly
12 .5%

very Ii kely
16 .7 %
CXl
N

very uni i ke ly
4 .2 %
lJl 1S lH O

! )( ). ( )')',

~-----------------not answering • 1

uni i kely
12 .5%

exempt from these calculations?
1.

2.
3.

4.

)very likely
)somewhat likely
)unsure

)unlikely
)very unlikely

5.

Results:
Table Twelve
INNOVATOR
MFR.
ANS:

#

#

GENERIC
MFR.
#

( %)

( %)

''OTHER''
#

TOTAL

( %)

#

( %)

( 1)

3 ( 20)

1 ( 25)

0

4 ( 16. 7)

(2 )

2 (13.3)

1 ( 25)

0

3 (12.5)

( 3)

8 (53.3)

1 (25)

3 ( 60)

(4 )

0

1 ( 25)

2 (40)

3 (12.5)

(5)

1

0

0

1

no answer

(6 . 7 )

12 (50)

( 4 . 2)

1

Statistical Tests:
The question is tested with a Chi Square "goodness of
· fit" test.

The hypotheses tested are:

Null Hypothesis:

the responses are a random

distr i bution.
Alternate Hypothesis:

the responses exhibit a

statistically significant preference.
Chi Square

=

2
Sigma (O-E) /E

The critical value of Chi Square at a 5% significance
level and degrees of freedom equal to 4 is 9.488.
of the test statistic calculated as above with n
(probability) p = 0.2 is 15.89.
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The value
=

23 and

Since the value of the test statistic falls in the rejection
region (Chi > 9.488) and the null is rejected.

The

alternate is accepted; the results are statistically
significant.
More than one quarter (29 . 2%) of respondents thought it
likely or somewhat likely that a bid group's acquisition, if
qualified as exempt, would result in lower prices.

This was

a lower number than the media reports led one to suspect
would answer in the affirmative.

As hypothesis H6G states:

- --That if a competitive procurement group's
acquisition can become classified as an "exempt award"
and, therefore, not a factor to be considered in the
Medicaid "best price" rebate calculations, this will
result in lower prices being offered.
Discussion:
The reasons why an exempt bid might win lower prices
are as discussed earlier, recall the "best price" and price
floor mechanisms.

Before OBRA '90, manufacturers could

price their pharmaceuticals at whatever (low) level they
chose.

If manufacturers really wanted to win a particular

bid, for example, for reasons of prestige or market
penetration in a particular area, or any reason, prices even
below cost could be offered.

Now OBRA '90 mandates that

Medicaid shall have access to rebates calculated from the
Average Manufacturers Price (AMP) or, if lower, shall
receive the manufacturers "best price" which OBRA defines
as:
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"
. The lowest price aid by any purchaser (exclusive
of depot prices and single award contract prices as
defined by any federal agency)
. exclusive of
nominal pr ices .
"
The "best price" scenario is well illustrated by
Myers:
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"Consider a company that sells a product at an average
manufacturer's price (AMP) of $50.00, but gives a
special price to $5.00 (best price) to hospitals or
other preferred buyers.
Assume these prices do not
change through 1993.
In 1991 this firm will have to
provide Medicaid a rebate of $12.50 per unit (25% of
AMP); in 1992 the rebate will increase to $25.00 (50%
of AMP).
. After 1992, however, the cap is
removed, and beginning in 1993 the rebate would be
$45.00 per unit.
. To avoid paying such a high
rebate a firm may try to raise its prices in the
preferred markets.
The closer the best price in the
preferred markets comes to the AMP, the lower the
firm's rebate . .
(to Medicaid)
will be."
Because the manufacturer offered this hospital (example
above) a lower price than the AMP, OBRA '90 mandates that an
extra rebate must be made to each state Medicaid agency as
calculated above.
On the other hand, the 29.2% of respondents who thought
exempt bids would receive lower prices compares well to
question seven regarding the Veterans Administration
pricing.

There, 50% of respondents said the Veterans

Administration received their lowest price for
pharmaceuticals.

Veterans pricing is specifically exempted

from the "best price" mechanism.

Selection of the Veterans

Administration in question number seven shows it is possible
for one purchaser to receive a lower price than other market
segments.

Most of those other segments listed in question

number seven do not have the "best price" exemption.
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Admittedly, it does not prove that the reason the Veterans
Administration obtained the lowest prices was because of the
"best price" exemption.

Literature quoted earlier leads one

to believe that the combination of competition and the low
cost of the depot system of distribution have been the
historic reasons the Veterans Administration has secured low
cost.

Nevertheless, what the literature and the

questionnaire responses do show is that manufacturers can
continue to offer the VA low prices by virtue of its
exemption without incurring rebate penalties under OBRA
'90's "best price" provisions.
Some bias is included in this question by surveying
those respondents who either do not participate in the
Medicaid rebates or who indicated that they charge all
buyers the same price.

These responders would be expected

to answer that exemption would not affect their bid prices.
Another issue might have been the perceived threat of
the question.

Respondents might have worried that bid

groups might incorrectly identify themselves as exempt.
Then having given those groups lower prices, perhaps depot
pricing, the company would be obligated to give extra
rebates to Medicaid because of the "best price" mechanism.
Examining responses further, one notices the large
number of "unsure" answers.

A total of 50% answered that

they were unsure that an exempt bid would result in lower
prices.

Those respondents who selected unsure may have done

so, in part, because they knew there is no specific method
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in the OBRA '90 regulations that explained how an
organization other than a federal agency may qualify itself
as "exempt" and, therefore, not affecting the Medicaid
rebate calculations.
Positive responses would have been higher than 29.2%
and unsure responses fewer if the question could have used
specific OBRA '90 language that qualified a group as exempt
in question twelve such as:

"assume a bid group qualifies

as exempt as established by paragraph 15 .

II

Since

exempt is undefined, many might have selected "unsure"
because they felt more information was needed.

They might

have been concerned that such exempt acquisition by
non-Federal purchasers was impossible.
Another possible factor is that the question asks how
likely respondent's company is to offer lower pricing.
Responders may have felt that elimination of the "best
price" mechanism as a factor would potentially allow lower
prices; however, they may have been unsure their company
would lower its prices regardless.
Finally, perhaps such a theoretical question was not
answerable without a full understanding of corporate
position on the matter and corporate position on such
matters may not exist.

Responders may have considered

themselves too low on the corporate ladder to speak on
policy issues not yet formed.
In summary, among those who expressed an opinion, as
opposed to "unsure", responses were almost 3:1 that
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exemption would allow lower prices (29.2% vs. 8.4%).

Only

29.2% of respondents support the hypothesis that exemption
from the "best price" mechanism would result in lower bid
acquisition prices for pharmaceuticals.

88

CONCLUSION
A majority of respondents on the Rhode Island
pharmaceutical bid list are and will continue to be
participants in the OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates.
Because of the nature of the population sampled, a list of
bidders in the State of Rhode Island, readers are cautioned
that the researcher cannot infer that these conclusions are
valid on a national basis.

Any extrapolations to the

national scene are solely at the discretion of the reader.
Literature surveyed indicates that it is in these vendors'
self-interest to participate because participation allows
eligibility of full product line to Medicaid coverage.

The

Medicaid market accounts for 10% of the dollar volume spent
on prescription drugs in the United States.

Participation

in the rebates, while providing substantial savings to
Medicaid's drug bill, is expected to result in the loss of
at least some gross profit to a majority of respondents.
When respondents were asked how such a loss in gross prof it
would be replaced, responses varied widely.

Public

statements of manufacturer spokespersons to the contrary,
the majority of respondents did not predict that loss of
gross profit would result in a reduction of research
expenditure; however, it was not possible to test these
responses for statistical significance.

Unfortunately, the

study was not able to determine pre-OBRA '90 research
activity because of space and content considerations, that
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is, to be effective the questionnaire could not be overly
long.

Paramount design considerations were for a brief,

easy, nonthreatening questionnaire to maximize response.
Therefore, requests for information that could be considered
confidential or sensitive were avoided.

Therefore, the data

are not sufficient to allow stratifying respondents
according to extent of pre-OBRA '90 research activity.
Regarding drug bid acquisition effects, findings
support the hypothesis that OBRA '90 rebates will result in
higher prices to those buyers other than Medicaid.

Buyers

employing competitive acquisitions, sometimes referred to as
·"preferred" buyers, will probably find that their customary
large discounts have been curtailed as a side effect of OBRA
'90's best price mechanism.

Pricing will still vary

customer by customer as the majority of respondents did not
predict any incentive to convert to uniform pricing.

In

addition, most respondents said that buyers will not be
provided with published best prices by their company.

This

would have been useful information for pharmaceutical buyers
to gauge the success of their competitive acquisitions.
Hence, buyers with no uniform pricing and no published
knowledge of "best price," will still labor to conduct
competitive bids, but results (low prices) may be less
rewarding than before OBRA '90.
result of two factors:

This will likely be the

one, the upward pressure on product

line prices in general, caused by an estimated $4.2 billion

90

dollars of Medicaid rebates over five years, and two, the
effect of the OBRA best price mechanism which will tend to
limit previously available deep discounts.
Recently, certain purchasers who find themselves
disadvantaged by the OBRA '90 best price mechanism are
requesting its repeal and some are seeking exemption from
the best price calculations in the hope of obtaining better
pricing.

An amendment to a separate Veterans Administration

law engineered by Senator Mikulski (D-MD):
"
. Has exempted V A (Veterans Administration) drug
discounts for six months from use in calculating
Medicaid "best price" available rebates. The intent of
the amendment was to encourage manufacturers to
increase discounts to V A by t~§ing V A pricing out of
the Medicaid rebate equation.''
(Note:
these would
be acquisitions other than the depot purchases which
are already exempt, see reference to FSS below.)
And VA Secretary Anthony Principi said he is:
"
. Pleased with the compromise that would provide a
permanent exemption of the FSS (Federal Suppl~
Schedule) from best price calculations . .
" 0
Also, in response to Congressional efforts by certain groups
to eliminate the best price mechanism of OBRA '90:
"Chairman Henry D. Waxman . . . (House Energy and
Commerce Subcommittee on Health and the Environment)
. has introduced an amendment that would retain the
current 'best price' method of calculating rebates from
drug manufacturers to state Medicaid programs through
fiscal year 1994, and exclude certain purchasers,
including the Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) and
the Indian HeaSth Service, from the calculation of
'best price'."
The possibility (question number twelve) of using an
exempt status from best price calculations to achieve lower
bid prices was also explored.

Results were inconclusive at
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the time of questionnaire response with the majority of
respondents saying they were unsure that exemption from best
price calculations would result in lower prices.

However,

those respondents expressing an opinion numbered
approximately 3:1 in the affirmative that exempt bids would
achieve lower prices by reason of their exempt status.
While support for the hypothesis that exemption from best
price mechanisms would lower bid prices was inconclusive,
the actions of various drug procurement groups to remove
themselves from the mechanism do support this hypothesis.
As mentioned above, some preferred purchasers and some
departments of the Federal government are actively seeking
legislative relief from the OBRA '90 best price side effects
in an effort to lower their drug acquisition cost.

92

ENDNOTES

1

Note: Medicaid (Title 19 of the Federal Social
Security Act) is a program of national health assistance,
funded by the Federal government and the states, for
low-income individuals and families who are aged, blind or
disabled, or members of families with dependent children.
2 Public Law 101-508.
3 Note:

The Average Wholesale Price is an average of
prices charged by representative wholesalers located in
different areas of the country which are then published in
various pharmacy trade publications.
4 william N. Bilotti, anecdotal by the author while on
staff at General Hospital, Rhode Island Medical Center,
Cranston, RI.
5 carmella Bocchino, "An Interview With Senator David H.
Pryor," Nursing Economic$, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January/February):
11.

6 Raehtz, Todd R., et al., "Factors Influencing Prices
Offered to Pharmaceutical Purchasing Groups," American
Journal of Hospital Pharmacy, 44 (September 1987):
2075.
7
York:

cotton M. Lindsay, The Pharmaceutical Industry,
John Wiley and Sons, 1978), 33.

(New

8

Sandra M. Rifkin, ed., "Pharmacies Applaud Pryor
Bill," American Druggist, Vol. 203 (May 1991):
23.
9

Paul Cano, "Pryor Bill Spurs Medicaid Cost Containment
Efforts," The Consultant Pharmacist, 5 (September 1990):
492.
10

Anon, "Drug Companies Are Cutting Discounts to
Hospitals, HMO's Says Pryor," American Society of Hospital
Pharmacists Newsletter, Vol. 24 (February 1991):
2.
11

Sandra M. Rifkin, ed., "Hospital Drug Prices Shoot
Up," American Druggist, Vol. 203 (May 1991):
14.
12

The American Biotechnology Association, "Are Cost
Control Policies Too Restrictive?" Healthspan, Vol. 7
(June 1990): 6.

93

13

(

Gerald J. Mossinghoff, "Just Take Two of These,"
Providence Journal/Bulletin, 19 October 1991.
14

Gilbert Churchill, Marketing Research,
CBS College Publishing, 1983): 283.

(New York:

15 Gilbert A. Churchill, Jr., Marketing Research,
York: CBS College Publishing, 1983), 511.

(New

16 Ibid., Churchill, 510.
17 Ibid., Churchill, 515.
18 Paul Erdos, Professional Mail Surveys,
McGraw Hill Book Company, 1970), 146.

(New York:

19 Paul Erdos, Professional Mail Surveys,
McGraw Hill Book Company, 1970), Chapter 14.

(New York:

20 sandra M. Rifkin, ed., "Medicaid Rebate Law Roils the
Marketplace," American Druggist, Vol. 203, No. 4 (April
1991):
16.
21 Gilbert A. Churchill, Marketing Research,
CBS College Publishing, 1983), 217-312.

(New York:

22 Sandra M. Rifkin, ed., "Medicaid Rebate Law Roils the
Marketplace," American Druggist, Vol. 203, No. 4 (April
1991):
14.
23 Ibid., p. 16.
24 John M. Coster, "The Pryor Bill: A Watershed Event
for Pharmacy," U.S. Pharmacist, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January
·1991):
58.
25 John M. Coster, "The Pryor Bill: A Watershed Event
for Pharmacy," U.S. Pharmacist, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January
1991):
56.
26 Kurt A. Proctor, ed., "Medicaid Rebate Collections
and Prescription Drug Expenditures Trends," The Pipeline,
Vol. 4, No. 4 (July 1992): 2.
27 John M. Coster, "The Pryor Bill: A Watershed Event
for Pharmacy," U.S. Pharmacist, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January
1991):
58.
R

&

28 somnath Pal, "Drug Industry Invests $10.9 Billion in
D." U.S. Pharmacist, (September 1992):
16.

29 Sandra M. Rifkin, "A Tale of Two Studies," American
Druggist, 205 (March 1992):
16.
94

30

Gerald J. Mossinghoff, "Just Take Two of These,"
Providence Journal Bulletin, 19 October 1991.
31

Harland A. Wade, "Positive and Negative Pressures
Buffet Pharmaceutical Industry," Pharmacists' Financial
News, Vol. 1, No. 2 (July 1992):
3.
32 sandra M. Rifkin, ed., "Hospital Drug Prices Shoot
Up." American Druggist, Vol., 203, No. 5 (May 1991):
14.
33 American Society of Hospital Pharmacists Newsletter,
Vol. 24, No. 2 (February 1991): 2.
34 Paul Cano, "Pryor Bill Spurs Medicaid Cost
Containment Efforts," The Consultant Pharmacist, Vol. 4,
No. 9 (September 1990): 492.
35 sandra M. Rifkin, ed., Pharmacists Applaud Pryor
Bill," American Druggist, Vol. 203, No. 5 (May 1991):
23.
36 Ibid., Raehtz, 2075.
37 Carmella Bocchino, "An Interview with Senator M.
Pryor," Nursing Economic$, Vol. 8, No. 1 (January/February):
6-12.
38 Note:

The Veterans Administration (VA) depot system
purchases pharmaceuticals in bulk, depots are located
regionally and the VA handles the distribution to
facilities, quantities are large and manufacturers save the
cost of distribution. This results in significant reduction
in drug cost acquisition to the VA.
Because part of the
savings resulting are from the distribution system unique to
the depot system, prices offered to the VA depot were
specifically exempted from calculations of the "best price"
by OBRA '90.
39 Todd R. Raehtz, R. Milewski, and N. Massoud, "Factors
Influencing Prices Offered to Pharmaceutical Purchasing
Groups," American Journal of Hospital Pharmacy, Vol. 44
(September 1987):
2075.
40 John M. Coster, "The Pryor Bill: A Watershed Event
for Pharmacy," U.S. Pharmacist, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January
1991):
58.
41 Robert D. Appel, ed., "Equal Access:
Is
Collaboration Possible?" National Association of Retail
Druggists Newsletter, Vol. 112, No. 21 (November 15, 1990):
4.

95

42

sandra M. Rifkin, ed., "Northeast Pharmaceutical
Conference," American Druggist, Vol. 203, No. 4 (April
1991):
16.
43

cotton M. Lindsay, ed., "The Pharmaceutical
Industry" (New York, N.Y.:
John Wiley and Sons, 1978):

34.

44

carmella Bocchino, "An Interview with Senator David
H. Pryor," Nursing Economic$, Vol. 8, No. 1
(January/February):
6-12.
45

Janice L. Feinberg, "OBRA '90:
Remnants of the
Medicaid Prudent Pharmaceutical Purchasing Act Become Law,"
The Consultant Pharmacist, Vol. 6, No. 1 (January 1991):
11.

46 sandra M. Rifkin, ed., "Medicaid Rebate Law Roils the
Marketplace," American Druggist, Vol. 203, No. 4 (April
1991):
16.
47

John M. Coster, "The Pryor Bill: A Watershed Event
for Pharmacy," U.S. Pharmacist, Vol. 16, No. 1 (January
1991):
56.
48 Maven J. Myers, "Possible Impact of the New Medicaid
Rebate Law." American Druggist, Vol. 203, No. 2 (February
1991):
73.
49

Denise Peterson, ed., "Senator Specter Drafting
Veterans' Drug Pricing Bill," The Green Sheet, 18 May 1992.
50 Denise Peterson, ed., "VA Says it is 'Quite Pleased'
With Agreement to Exempt Prices From Medicaid," The Green
Sheet, Vol. 41, No. 33 (August 1992):
3.
51 Robert D. Appel, "Amendment Would Keep 1990-1995
Medicaid 'Best Price' Formula," National Association of
Retail Druggists Newsletter, Vol. 114, No. 20 (May 1992):
6.

96

(

APPENDIX ONE
Definitions:
"Best Price":
. "the lowest price paid by any purchaser
(exclusive of depot prices and single award contract prices
as defined by any federal agency)
. exclusive of nominal
prices .
"
"Average Manufacturers Price: ("AMP " ):
"
. the average
price paid by wholesalers for drugs distributed to the
retail class of trade .
"
Generic Drug: Multi-source drugs whose exclusive patent
rights have expired and with proper application to the FDA
may be made by various pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Also called "non-innovator multiple source drugs".
Generic Rebate Plan:
For 1991 to 1993 the rebate is 10 %;
for 1994 and future years the rebate will be 11%.
Innovator Drug: A drug whose exclusive patent rights have
not expired.
Patent holder has rights to exclusive
manufacturer but may cross license other firms to
manufacture.
OBRA, The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act:
Provisions of
this legislation require manufacturers to rebate certain
portions of the purchase price of pharmaceuticals to the
Medicaid Program in each state. Sometimes referred to as
the Medicaid Prudent Purchaser Requirements.
CPI-U: Consumer Price Index-all urban consumers, used to
calculate the rate of inflation for drug prices to see if an
additional rebate is required.
Additional Rebate: An extra rebate that is calculated using
CPI-U, on a drug-by-drug basis, to recover the increase in
average manufacturers prices over the rate of inflation,
with October 1, 1990, used as a baseline for AMP.
"Exempt Award":
For the purposes of this research an
"exempt award" is an hypothetical price agreement between a
manufacturer and a purchaser in which the price quoted will
not affect the "best price to any purchaser" as defined by
OBRA '90.
Such an award will not cause the manufacturer to
extend similar pricing to Medicaid or be used in any AMP
calculations.
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APPENDIX TWO
Pharmaceutical Benefits Supplied Under State Medical
Assistance Programs: 1
"Medicaid (Title XIX of the federal Social Security
Act) is a program of national health assistance, funded
by the federal government and the states, for
low-income individuals and families who are aged, blind
or disableq, or members of families with dependent
children."
Medicaid is separate and distinct from Medicare, which
is a program of medical assistance for the elderly and
administered by the Social Security Administration (SSA).
Each state and some territories operate Medicaid
programs according to their own rules within a broad
framework of Federal guidelines.
Medicaid was enacted in the Social Security Amendments
of 1965, it replaced a system of categorical public
. assistance that allowed the federal government to share with
the states the cost of maintaining certain groups and
providing for their medical treatment.

Because the need for

increased Medical services created the need for increased
funding, Medicaid was created and amended to provide grants
to states to enable states to provide the necessary medical

1

Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical Assistance
Programs, Fowler, Richard W., ed., National Pharmaceutical
Council, Reston, VA
22091 (September 1991), pp. 1-25.
2

Ibid., pp. 1-25.
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assistance and the categorical public assistance programs
were ended.
Medicaid is available to all persons who are receiving
payments under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program and, with a few exceptions, to the aged, blind and
disabled who receive Supplemental Security Income:
Eligibility standards must conform with Federal
guidelines.
Payment for services is made directly to health care
providers by the state administering agency or its
representatives.
States provide their own quality control system
following Federal guidelines.
In 1990, Medicaid accounted for $64.8 billion in
Federal and state expenditures for medical services.
Federal regulations describe a broad outline within which
states may tailor their own programs.

Funding is shared

between states and the Federal government.

The Federal

government matches state health care provider reimbursements
at a rate of between 50% and 83% depending on the state's
per capita income.

In Rhode Island the Federal Medical

Assistance Percentage {FMAP) is 53.29%.
Federal law requires that all persons who qualify for
Aid to Families with Dependent Children {AFDC) and most
persons who qualify for Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
also receive Medicaid coverage.
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Certain basic services are

required to be provided under the Medicaid coverage while
others are included at the state's option.

States may

expand coverage to additional groups of people and expand
the range of services offered.
Services Provided Under Medicaid:
1.

Professional Services

2.

Nursing Care Services

3.

Nursing Home Services

4.

Hospital and Clinic Services

5.

Drugs, Supplies and Equipment

6.

Special Services and Therapy

7.

Institutional Care

8.

Other

Pharmaceutical Reimbursement After OBRA 1990:
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
incorporated various measures to reduce expenditures for
prescription drug products provided to Medicaid patients.
Public Law 101-508 resulted from the OBRA 1990 and was
enacted on November 5, 1990.

Accordingly, effective January

1, 1991, pharmaceutical manufacturers must agree to provide
rebates to all state Medicaid agencies in order for their
products to be eligible for inclusion in Medicaid programs.
(see OBRA rebate summary, Appendix 4).
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APPENDIX THREE
SUMMARY OF OBRA '90 MANDATED MEDICAID REBATES!
As part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1990, certain elements of previously submitted bills
designed to reduce Federal and state outlays for
prescription drug products provided to Medicaid outpatients
were signed into law (Public Law 101-508).

Accordingly,

effective January 1991, in prder for a manufacturer's drug
product line to be eligible for any coverage under Medicaid,
the manufacturer must provide rebates to all state Medicaid
programs.
REBATE TERMS FOR SOLE SOURCE AND INNOVATOR MULTI-SOURCE
PRODUCTS:
Sole source and innovator multi-source products
manufacturers are to pay the following rebates to
each state Medicaid program quarterly.
1991: Whichever is greater, 12.5% of the average
manufacturers price (AMP) or the difference between
AMP and the best price, not to exceed 25%. That is,
the amount of rebate is capped at 25% of the AMP.
1992: The same as 1991, except the cap becomes 50%.
The potential rebate is increased to 50% of the
difference between the AMP and the "best price".
1993: Whichever is greater, 15% of the AMP or the
entire difference between AMP and the "best price",
for 1993 there is no cap.
1994:

The same as 1993.

1

william A. Zellmer, ed., "Summary of 1990 Medicaid
Drug Rebate Legislation," American Journal of Hospital
Pharmacy, Vol. 48 (January 1991):
114-117.
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REBATE TERMS FOR GENERIC PRODUCTS:
1991 to 1993:
1994:

The rebate is 10%

The rebate is 11%.

ADDITIONAL REBATE:
Should a manufacturer raise drug prices more than the
rate of inflation, an additional rebate must be
provided to Medicaid to the extent the price rise
exceeds the Consumer Price Index.
1991 to 1993: Additional rebate is calculated for each
product of a manufacturer.
1994: The additional rebate is calculated on the basis
of the manufacturers product line.
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APPENDIX FOUR
Hypotheses:
Hl.
That most manufacturers on the State of Rhode
Island bid list are familiar with the OBRA '90 mandated
Medicaid rebate requirements.
H2.
That most manufacturers are participating in the
OBRA '90 mandated Medicaid rebates.
H3.
That most manufacturers will continue to
participate or will begin to participate in the OBRA
'90 mandated Medicaid rebates in the near term (one
year).
H4.
That a majority of manufacturers will expect to
lose some Gross Profit margin as a result of furnishing
Medicaid rebates to each state Medicaid plan.
HS.
That a reduction in profits because of the OBRA
'90 mandated Medicaid rebates will cause a reduction in
funds available to support research.
H6.
That the following effects will occur in drug bid
acquisitions:
H6a:
That OBRA '90 mandated rebates to one
segment of the pharmaceutical market will have the
unwanted effect of exerting an upward influence on
prices available to buyers other than Medicaid.
H6b:
That all purchasers do not necessarily pay
the same price for pharmaceuticals.
H6c:
That OBRA '90 will not cause all purchasers
to receive the same price.
H6d:
That while a "best price" will be known and
established in order to calculate the Medicaid
rebate amounts, it will not be made generally
available to buyers to serve as a reference tool
or benchmark against which they might judge the
success of their acquisitions.
H6e:
That OBRA '90 will diminish manufacturers
ability to offer low bid prices on innovator drugs
to competitive bid acquisitions.
H6f:
That OBRA '90 will diminish manufacturers
ability to offer low bid prices on generic drugs
to competitive bid acquisitions.
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H6g:
That if a competitive procurement group's
acquisition can become classified as an "exempt
award" and, therefore, not a factor to be
considered in the Medicaid "best price" rebate
calculations, this will result in lower prices
being offered.
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APPENDIX FIVE
Exhibits:
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11 Ridge Road
North Scituate, RI
Date ...

02857

Director of Professional Relations

Dear Colleague,
I am writing to request your help.
By surveying active
bidders on the annual Pharmaceutical contracts for the State
of Rhode Island, I hope to find what effect, if any,
Federally mandated Medicaid rebates will have on the prices
paid by the State of Rhode Island and other procurement
groups.
Until recently, I was the Medical Buyer for the State
of Rhode Island and that assignment created my interest in
this topic.
Presently, I am a Master of Science Degree
Candidate in the Pharmacy Administration Program at the
University of Rhode Island, College of Pharmacy, and this
work will be important to my degree research requirements.
Enclosed is a brief questionnaire that will take but a
few moments to complete and return in the stamped reply
envelope.

All replies are strictly confidential, there are no
hidden identifiers and all answers will be used only in
statistical tables.
Because the sampling group is select, your response is
very important to the success of this poll.
Even if you
feel that you are not the most qualified to answer the
questions, your response is valuable because it will improve
statistical accuracy and help to minimize sample bias.
If
you are still hesitant, please refer this survey to someone
in your organization who will answer.
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If you are interested in receiving a report on the
findings of this research, simply write your name and
address at the end of the questionnaire.
Or, if you prefer,
request the results of the survey in a separate letter.
Either way, your confidentiality will be respected.
Because this project must be closed soon, I would
appreciate your prompt response.
Thank you in advance for
your kind assistance.
Sincerely,

William N. Bilotti, RPh.
MS Candidate
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11 Ridge Road
North Scituate, RI
Date . ..

Address ...

Dear Colleague,
Recently we mailed you a questionnaire asking for your
help in an important survey.
If you have already returned the questionnaire, please
consider this note a "Thank you" for your valuable help.
If you have not had a chance to do so as yet, may we
ask you to return the completed form now.
Your
participation is vital to the success of our study.
Sincerely yours,

William N. Bilotti, RPh.
MS Candidate
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PHARMACEUTICAL PROCUREMENT SURVEY
DEFINITION OF TERMS:
"Best Price":
."The lowest price paid by any purchaser
(exclusive of depot prices and single award contract prices
as defined by any Federal agency)
. exclusive of nominal
prices .
"
"Average Manufacturers Price", ("AMP"):
. "The average
price paid by wholesalers for drugs distributed to the
retail class of trade .
"
Generic Drug: Multi-source drugs whose exclusive patent
rights have expired and with proper application to the FDA
may be made by various pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Also
called "non-innovator multiple source drugs".
Generic Rebate Plan:
For 1991 to 1993 the rebate is 10%;
for 1994 and future years the rebate will be 11%.
OBRA, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act:
Provisions of this
legislation require manufacturers to rebate certain portions
of the purchase price of pharmaceuticals to the Medicaid
Program.
sometimes referred to as the Medicaid Prudent
Purchaser Requirements.
Survey Questions:
1.

Are you familiar with the Medicaid rebate requirements
mandated by the OBRA '90, sometimes referred to as the
Medicaid Prudent Purchaser Requirements?
1.
( ) yes
2.
( ) no
3.
( ) not sure

2.

Does your company participate in the Medicaid rebate
program?
1.
( ) yes
2.
( ) no
3.
) not sure

3.

How likely is your company to begin and/or continue
participation within one year?
1.
( )very likely
4.
)unlikely
2.
( ) likely
5.
)very unlikely
3.
( ) not sure

4.

What effect, if any, do you think the Medicaid rebates
will have on the Gross Profit margin of your company's
pharmaceutical line?
1.
( )strong increase
4.
)some decrease
5•
)strong decrease
2.
( )some increase
3.
()no effect

If you answered 1, 2 or 3, please go to question number 6.
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5.

Which of these strategies is your company most likely
to employ, other than price increases, to recover any
profit margins that might be reduced by supplying
rebates to State Medicaid programs?
1.
( )cut advertising
4.
( )reduce research
2.
( )expand markets
expenditure
3.
( ) cut mfr. costs
5.
) other

6.

Some purchasers believe that mandated discounts to
Medicaid have exerted upward pressure on the prices of
pharmaceuticals available to the public through
channels other than Medicaid; what is your opinion?
1.
( )strongly agree
4.
( )disagree
2.
( )agree
5.
( )disagree strongly
3.
( ) no opinion

7.

Which of the following drug purchasers, in general,
currently receives your lowest price for your single
and/or multiple source innovator drugs?
(check one)
1.
( )Medicaid
6.
)Veterans Administration
2.
( ) hospital
7.
) chain pharmacy
3.
( ) Ind. pharmacy
8.
) wholesaler
4.
( ) State Govt.
9.
) none of these
5.
( )buying group
10.
)all buyers/same price---Go To Question #9.

8.

If you did not ch~ck "same price", how likely do you
think that the OBRA legislation will provide an
incentive to your company to offer the same price to
all these purchasers?
l.
( ) very likely
4.
) unlikely
2.
( ) likely
5.
)very unlikely
3.
( ) not sure

9.

As the legislation requires a 12.5% discount from AMP
or a "manufacturers best price", how likely is your
company to publish these Medicaid prices, for example,
in the company catalog, the REDBOOK, etc., so that
other groups may use them as a reference?
1.
( ) very likely
4.
( ) unlikely
2.
( )somewhat likely
5.
( )very unlikely
3.
( ) not sure

***Many segments of the pharmaceutical market practice
competitive procurement, i.e., sealed buds, contract
purchasing, buying groups and so forth.
The following
questions are designed to assess how this legislation will
impact the prices your company will offer to these groups.
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10.

Because of the OBRA legislation, my company's ability
to extend special pricing to competitive procurement
groups for single and/or multi-sourced innovator drugs
will be ...
1.
( ) greatly increased
4.
) decreased
2.
( ) increased
5.
) greatly decreased
3.
( )not affected

11.

Because of the OBRA legislation, my company's ability
to extend special pricing to competitive procurement
groups for generic drugs (multi-sourced, non-innovator)
will be ...
1.
( ) greatly increased
4.
) decreased
2.
( ) increased
5.
) greatly decreased
3.
( )not affected

12.

OBRA specifies that "single contract awards" and
"exempt awards" will be affect Medicaid rebate
calculations. Assume a bid group can qualify their
acquisitions as such. How likely is the group to
obtain better pricing from your company if the prices
you offer are exempt from these calculations?
1.
( ) very likely
4.
( ) unlikely
2.
( )somewhat likely
5.
( )very unlikely
3.
( ) unsure

Please tell me about your company:
13.

Is your company a manufacturer of pharmaceuticals at
this time?
1.
( ) yes
3.
) no--Skip to
2.
( ) not sure
Question #16.

14.

Do you manufacture prescription pharmaceuticals?
1.
( ) yes
2.
( ) no
3.
( ) not sure

15.

Does your company manufacture only generic drugs at
this time?
1.
( ) yes
2.
( ) no
3.
( ) not sure

16.

Do you market any prescription drugs protected by
exclusive patent--either by your own discovery and/or
by license agreement?
1.
( )yes
2.
( )no
3.
( )not sure

Strictly optional:
What is your job title?
(e.g., vice president,
supervisor, director, etc.):
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If you would like a copy of the survey results as soon as
available, fill in your name, company and address below.
Or, you may ·request the results by sending a stamped,
self-addressed envelope under separate cover.

Please return the survey in the stamped envelope provided
without delay.
THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR COOPERATION.
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